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1.  INTRODUCTION 
According to an old Armenian proverb, “the clouds that thunder 
do not always bring rain.”1  Exactly the same can be said about OTC 
derivatives that “thunder” in the financial world.  The only question 
is whether they really may cause “rain” in the form of a financial 
crisis.  This is particularly important in the context of the financial 
crisis in 2008.  Finding a clear answer to that question would proba-
bly make it easier to understand and resolve another problem—how 
to regulate OTC derivatives.  
Unfortunately, it seems that it is almost impossible to reach any 
sort of consensus on this issue.  Many financial analysts, policymak-
ers, and regulators have completely different opinions on the causes 
of the 2008 financial crisis.  This disagreement led to endless debates 
regarding the role OTC derivatives played in that crisis and, thus, 
the necessary extent of OTC derivatives regulation.  Supporters of 
the opinion that OTC derivatives caused the crisis, certainly, would 
insist on their detailed regulation.  Advocates of the opinion that 
OTC derivatives market had nothing to do with the crisis of 2008 
would obviously be against heavy regulation of these financial in-
struments, or any regulation at all.  There are also those with inter-
mediate positions on this issue, i.e., accepting the necessity of OTC 
derivatives regulation, but only to a certain extent.  A completely 
different view, which also exists among scholars, proposes refusing 
to enforce an OTC derivative contract as a speculation instrument, 
and enforcing only those contracts where one of the parties is truly 
using it for hedging (insurance).2  
At the same time, despite the absence of unanimity on the ques-
tion of OTC derivatives regulation, the Group of Twenty (“G-20”) 
Leaders agreed in Pittsburgh in 2009 on certain aspects of OTC de-
rivatives regulation as:  (1) attempting to standardize contracts, (2) 
developing mandatory central clearing of standard OTC deriva-
tives, (3) requiring reports to trade depositories, and (4) imposing 
                                                     
1 GEVORG R. BAYAN, ARMENIAN PROVERBS AND SAYINGS, TRANSLATED INTO 
ENGLISH 11 (1932), available at http://www.armenews.com/IMG/Armenian_ 
proverbs_1932.pdf [https://perma.cc/S95N-FJBC]. 
2 Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, 32 REG. 30 
(2009) (hereinafter Regulate OTC Derivatives). 
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higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared contracts.3  
Moreover, the first wave of reforms and enacted legislation in re-
sponse to the financial crisis has already passed in certain G-20 
countries, including the US and the EU. 
The primary purpose of this Article is to engage in a comparative 
analysis of current OTC derivatives regulation in the US and the EU 
with the intent to use the comparison to develop a model regulatory 
framework for OTC derivatives.  Such analysis is crucially im-
portant, as OTC derivatives, like many other financial instruments, 
are not limited to certain borders due to the globalized financial 
world.  Thus, the regulation of OTC derivatives has to be not just 
simply domestically, but also internationally, correlated.  The choice 
of legal framework is determined by jurisdictional territory and the 
US and EU include almost two-thirds of the G20 countries—where 
the most trade of derivatives takes place.  Besides, these areas rep-
resent two different legal systems with different development levels 
of current OTC derivatives regulation. 
Another purpose of this Article is to apply the aforementioned 
old Armenian proverb to OTC derivatives and to discuss their role 
in the financial crisis of 2008, as well as the question of to what extent 
they should be regulated, if at all.  The heavy regulation of OTC de-
rivatives seems problematic, as the key difference between OTC de-
rivatives and exchange-traded derivatives is their lower level of 
standardization.  On the other hand, the unregulated OTC market 
has caused many concerns among financial specialists in the past, 
especially during the financial crisis of 2008.  This Article argues that 
(1) unregulated OTC derivatives bear certain risks that exceed the 
benefits of their use and (2) while many of these risks materialized 
during the crisis of 2008, the OTC market did not actually cause the 
crisis; therefore, (3) regulation is still necessary—but only to a cer-
tain extent. 
Part 2 contains an overview of derivatives and discusses their 
role in the financial crisis of 2008. Part 3 explains the current regula-
tory regimes in the US and the EU for OTC derivatives by using a 
comparative analysis of the two regimes to identify the advantages 
                                                     
3 G20 LEADERS’ STATEMENT, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT (2009), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/ 
pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3ME-
792F] (articulating aspects of OTC derivatives regulation that garnered consensus 
among the G20 leaders). 
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and disadvantages of the two approaches, while developing a 
model regulatory framework for the regulation of OTC derivatives.  
The Conclusion summarizes the outcome of the analysis and model 
development, and discusses its implications for future regulation of 
OTC derivatives. 
2.  OTC DERIVATIVES ESSENTIALS AND REGULATION RATIONALE 
2.1. Overview of Derivatives 
Before we can understand the role that OTC derivatives played 
in the financial crisis of 2008 and the appropriate regulatory frame-
work necessary for efficient OTC derivatives markets (which would 
be necessary to discuss the cutting-edge issues of the global OTC 
derivatives regulation), it is worth understanding the basics of OTC 
derivatives:  their substance, the various types, and market size.  Un-
sophisticated forms of derivatives existed at least 4,000 years ago in 
the ancient markets.4  Current derivatives have very little in com-
mon with their ancient forms,5 which is unsurprising, as every 
“product” of the human mind has developed on a "simple-to-com-
plex" basis. 
There are many complex definitions of derivatives given by legal 
scholars and finance specialists, but, essentially, derivatives are fi-
nancial instruments whose value is derived from another underly-
ing asset (such as a security or commodity).6  Although such a defi-
nition might be fairly criticized as being “more descriptive than 
prescriptive” and “inadequate to sustain legal reasoning”7, we con-
sider it appropriate and sufficient for the purposes of this Article.  
Derivatives were initially intended for neutralizing or “hedging” 
risks.  Nowadays, however, they are very often used for speculating.  
                                                     
4 Edward J. Swan, Building the Global Market: A 4000 Year History of De-
rivatives 27 (2000). 
5 Id. at 28. 
6 ROBERT E. LITAN, INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY AT 
BROOKINGS, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS' CLUB AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A
 GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND 
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 3, 12 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Research/Files/Papers/2010/4/07%20derivatives%20litan/0407_             
derivatives_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6XG-LMQX] (defining “derivatives”). 
7 RAFFAELE SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION: A TRAPPED INNOVATION 
AND A BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATORY REFORM 9–10 (2011). 
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This is why some scholars also compare contracting derivatives to 
betting.8 
To illustrate the aforementioned ways of using derivatives let us 
give an example of a very simple derivative contract—a put option.  
Assume that an investor has a portion of the common stock of Ap-
ple, Inc. in his portfolio.  Despite the company’s good performance, 
the investor is still concerned that the volatility of the market might 
adversely affect stock prices.  To protect his investment and to hedge 
that risk, he can buy the right to sell his Apple stocks at or before a 
specified date (“maturity date”) and at a predetermined price 
(“strike price”), i.e., buy a put option for his Apple stocks.  In this 
way the put option can mitigate the investor’s risk that the stock 
price falls below the strike price.  The put option could also be used 
in a speculative way by investors who are willing to bet on stock 
prices falling or growing.  
There are four main types of derivatives:  
(a) Forward contracts - agreements to buy something at a 
specified price on a specified future date; 
(b) Futures contracts - generic types of forward contracts ex-
ecuted at an exchange; 
(c) Swap contracts - agreements to exchange future cash 
flows, where the amounts to be exchanged are based on a 
future variable; and 
(d) Option contracts - agreements granting the holder the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell something at a 
specified price on or before a specified future date.9 
Another common division is between derivatives traded over 
organized exchanges (“exchange-traded derivatives”) and the OTC 
market (“OTC derivatives”).  Exchange-traded derivatives are listed 
and concluded on an authorized and regulated derivatives ex-
change such as the Chicago Board of Trade, the Boston Options Ex-
change, the New York Mercantile Exchange, or Philadelphia Stock 
                                                     
8 Lynn. A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (hereinafter Credit Crisis) (attributing the 2008 downfall of “sev-
eral systematically important financial institutions” to “bad derivatives bets”). 
9 Alireza M. Gharagozlou, Unregulable: Why Derivatives May Never Be Regu-
lated, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269, 273 (2010) (listing types of derivatives). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
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Exchange.  These derivatives are standardized, i.e., they have stand-
ard size, contractual terms, and rules of trading set by the exchange.  
All of this makes a derivatives exchange a liquid marketplace.  
Moreover, the exchange-traded derivatives are negotiated through 
clearinghouses, a central counterparty system, which means that the 
parties to a derivative do not deal directly with each other.  Each 
market participant has to clear its trades through the clearinghouse 
at the end of each trading session and deposit a margin sufficient to 
cover its debit balance with the clearing house.  Finally, the ex-
change-traded derivatives market is highly transparent, as deriva-
tives pricing is public.  The Bank for International Settlements (the 
“BIS”) estimated that there were over 231.1 million outstanding con-
tracts on organized exchanges with a notional principal amount of 
29 trillion US dollars10 as of June 2014, of which 82.3 million were 
entered into in North America and 82.6 million in Europe.11  
However, the aforementioned advantages of the exchange-
traded derivatives do make them limited in many ways.  First, the 
exchange-traded derivatives are not flexible financial instruments as 
they are fully standardized and may not be modified.  Thus, such 
instruments may not always be able to satisfy the parties’ business 
interests.  Moreover, the heavy regulation, including such preven-
tive mechanisms as margin and clearing requirements, significantly 
increases the costs of the exchange-traded derivatives market par-
ticipants.  Hence, many traders would prefer dealing on the much 
less regulated, less costly, and therefore, more convenient, OTC 
market. 
OTC derivatives were traditionally negotiated privately and di-
rectly allowed counterparties to tailor a contract to their individual 
specific needs.  As OTC transactions were not processed through 
regulated exchanges, they were not subject to the same standardiza-
tion, clearing, and margin requirements as exchange-traded deriva-
tives were.  This was probably the reason why the OTC market was 
                                                     
10 Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Exchange Traded Derivatives Statistics, Table 
23A: Derivative financial instruments traded on organised exchanges, BIS 
QUARTERLY REV. 146 (Sep. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_ 
qa1409_hanx23a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4CC-GCBS]. 
11 Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Exchange Traded Derivatives Statistics, BIS 
QUARTERLY REV. 147, Table 23B: Number of contracts (contracts outstanding and 
turnover) (Sep. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/r_qa1409_ 
hanx23b.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FSF-93QD]. 
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more attractive for investors and why the notional amounts out-
standing of OTC derivatives were greater than the exchange market.  
However, the absence of regulation is no longer the case in most de-
veloped jurisdictions including the US, the EU and, to some extent, 
Russia, where OTC derivatives reforms started shortly after the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008.  At the same time, while the reforms are not 
finished yet and not all requirements have become effective, the no-
tional amount of outstanding global OTC derivatives as of June 2014 
was estimated to be almost 700 trillion US dollars.12   
Essentially, the question arises: why and to what extent do OTC 
derivatives need to be regulated?  What benefits do they have and 
what risks do they expose to the market participants?  What role did 
they play in the crisis of 2008?  
2.2. OTC Derivatives Benefits and Costs 
The use of OTC derivatives, like the use of almost any other fi-
nancial instrument, has certain benefits and costs.  It is necessary to 
not only identify these benefits and costs, but also to analyze them 
and ascertain which are more substantial.  In other words, we try to 
determine whether advantages prevail over potential costs and 
whether actions can be taken to mitigate significant risks, e.g., via 
regulation.  
2.2.1. Benefits 
Prior to discussing the costs of OTC derivatives and the risks 
they may generate, it would be fair to mention the benefits of these 
instruments that make them so popular among investors and end-
users.  
2.2.1.1. Traditional Use of OTC Derivatives 
OTC derivatives are mainly used for the following three pur-
poses:  hedging, speculating, and arbitrage.  
                                                     
12 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES 
STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2014 1 (Nov. 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/otc_hy1411.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6R-MWYP] (identifying that the no-
tional value of outstanding contracts, which is used as an indicator of overall activ-
ity, at the end of June was $691 trillion). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
 




First of all, as mentioned earlier, since OTC derivatives are not 
standardized instruments, they are more flexible in terms and, 
therefore, may be customized for the specific needs of each party.  
This is important as, in practice, situations that may arise and re-
quire hedging are essentially unpredictable and certainly not stand-
ardized.  For instance, a producer of wheat wants to increase its pro-
duction in response to increased demand.  The necessary 
infrastructure is expensive, but the investment is justified by rising 
demand.  Financing will only be available, however, if the producer 
is able to lock in the price at which it can expect to sell its product in 
the future.  The dealer provides that price risk protection through a 
customized OTC derivative.13  
OTC derivatives may also be used by multinational corporations 
to reduce exposure to fluctuating exchange rates by locking in an 
exchange rate via currency derivatives. 
Despite the obvious advantages of using OTC derivatives as a 
hedging instrument, there is an interesting debate among scholars 
whether such hedging by a corporation creates any value for the 
shareholders.14  The opponents of hedging would claim that many 
wise shareholders have already hedged their risk exposures by di-
versifying their portfolios.  However, the counterargument would 
be that using derivatives for hedging purposes creates shareholder 
value by reducing the volatility of the company’s earnings, which 
positively affects the price of the company’s shares, i.e., shareholder 
equity.  
Finally, a more global advantage of hedging lies behind the as-
sumption that both parties of the derivatives transaction are hedg-
ers, and their opposite risks would off-set each other and therefore, 
maintain economic stability.15  
                                                     
13 INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, OTC DERIVATIVES: 
BENEFITS TO US COMPANIES, 4 (2009), available at https://www.sifma.org/           up-
loadedfiles/issues/regulatory_reform/otc_derivatives/isdacongressslides5-
28v2may2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/38FT-DAVG]. 
14 The following arguments in this paragraph are based on Scalcione, supra 
note 8, at 48–49 (“[W]hile hedging existing risk should remain unconstrained, a risk 
taking derivatives operation should be carried out in a regulated environment for 
the protection of the market at large.”). 
15 Kevin Meyer, Analysing the New OTC Derivatives Regulations: A Critical 
Overview of Tomorrow’s Legal Framework 4 (August 26, 2011) (unpublished 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 




Whereas certain companies use OTC derivatives to hedge their 
risks, many corporations and individuals speculate on them in order 
to try to achieve huge returns.  Despite the fact that speculation ex-
poses companies to significant risks (to be discussed in the next sec-
tion), it can also have some positive impact on the market condi-
tions.  First, speculation supports the level of liquidity on the market 
that is necessary for its normal operation.  Moreover, Friedman’s 
“rational speculation” hypothesis contends that if a market price 
moves away from its “fundamental” value, which is an indicator of 
the market's competitive and rational operation, then speculators 
will bring that “fundamental” value back.16   
2.2.1.1.3. Arbitrage 
Arbitrage is the strategy of discovering and taking advantage of 
market anomalies and inefficiencies.  For instance, if a certain com-
pany’s stock trades at a lower price on one stock exchange than on 
the other, an arbitrageur would purchase the stock on the former 
exchange and sell it on the latter, i.e., would pocket the difference.  
On one hand, OTC derivatives have a lower level of liquidity 
than exchange derivatives as a result of their status as non-standard-
ized contracts.  They therefore intuitively would seem less attractive 
for arbitrageurs.  However, OTC derivatives could still serve as an 
arbitrage tool due to both their high level of customization, i.e., flex-
ibility, and their low level of transparency (the marginal differences 
in such contracts could be much larger).  In other words, arbitra-
geurs using OTC derivatives could gain more money using less lev-
erage than they could using the exchange traded contracts. 
                                                     
L.L.M. thesis, Edinburgh University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2121222 [https://perma.cc/GLE8-YNMK].  
16 Dick Bryan & Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political 
Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital & Class 125-26 (2006). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
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2.2.1.2.  Other Ways of Using OTC Derivatives 
2.2.1.2.1. Information Disclosure to Markets 
Derivatives can serve as an instrument for sending certain sig-
nals to the market regarding a company’s performance.  For exam-
ple, in the case of Intel,17 the management sent an explicit message 
to shareholders about their expectations on the company’s future 
share price through derivatives.  Rather than just distributing divi-
dends, which would immediately affect the share price, Intel’s man-
agement decided to distribute “put warrants” to shareholders at a 
strike price sufficiently high enough to indicate their confidence that 
the company’s future share price would be much higher. 
2.2.1.2.2. Tax Benefits 
As discussed above, derivatives can be used as hedging instru-
ments and can reduce the volatility of the company’s earnings.  Re-
duction of the earnings’ fluctuations also leads to the reduction of 
tax liabilities which consequently adds value to the company.18 
2.2.1.2.3. Hedge Accounting 
Companies using OTC derivatives are able to benefit from hedge 
accounting rules, which require a close fit between a hedge and the 
underlying risk.19  The rule of “marking to market” causes volatility 
in profit and loss and therefore affects how others view the com-
pany.  When a company uses hedge accounting, entries for the own-
ership of a security and the opposing hedge are treated as one.20  
Therefore, hedge accounting reduces the volatility in profit and loss 
(as well as in the balance sheet) that is created by the repeated 
“marking to market” adjustment of a financial instrument’s value. 
                                                     
17 The following case description in this paragraph is based on Scalcione, supra 
note 8, at 52-53. 
18 Scalcione, supra note 8, at 56. 
19 JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 38 (7th ed. 2008). 
20 Hedge Accounting, INVESTOPEDIA DICTIONARY, http://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/h/hedge-accounting.asp [https://perma.cc/P97U-K2AL]. 
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2.2.1.2.4. Credit Derivatives 
There are a number of benefits specific to credit derivatives.  
Credit derivatives may avoid undesirable credit exposures and re-
distribute them among banks and institutional investors who find 
them attractive as a tool for diversifying their portfolios.21  In addi-
tion, credit derivatives may serve as a mechanism to customize the 
risk-return profile of a financial product.22  Credit default swaps 
(“CDSs”), by limiting banks’ risk, increase their credit capacity and 
willingness to lend.  Therefore, CDSs greatly facilitate companies’ 
access to capital from bank loans.23  Sometimes OTC derivatives can 
even be an indicator of the inadequacy of specific market prices.24  
For instance, CDS spreads signal the market's attitude towards a cer-
tain credit risk.25 
Thus, OTC derivatives play an important role in various indus-
tries and geographic areas.  They are used to manage certain risks 
and capital raising activities and are thought to increase economic 
growth.  However, these benefits are not without costs. 
2.2.2. Costs 
Along with the numerous aforementioned benefits, OTC deriv-
atives expose market participants to certain risks.  Therefore, this 
next Section provides an overview of the costs of the use of OTC 
derivatives including the OTC market specifics as well as certain 
types of generated risks. 
                                                     
21 J.P. Morgan & Co. & RiskMetrics Group, The J.P. Morgan Guide to Credit De-
rivatives, § 3 (1999), available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/ 
Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DRV-BL5H]. 
22 Id. 
23 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Deriva-
tives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2007) (“Because swaps limit the bank’s downside 
risk (and pass it on to other parties, such as insurance companies and pension 
funds), banks are willing to lend much more to many more businesses.”). 
24 Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Deriv-
atives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2010). 
25 Michael Casey, U.S. Is Riskier Than Euro Zone; So Says CDS Market, WALL ST. 
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2.2.2.1. OTC Market Specifics 
The most important feature of the global OTC market usually 
considered from the point of hedging risks is its potential for gener-
ating new market risks.  This potential is determined by its specific 
characteristics, which can be divided into several groups.26 
2.2.2.1.1. Combination of Classic and Exotic Contracts 
The first group of such characteristics relates to the large variety 
of OTC derivative contracts, which is much greater than the variety 
of exchange contracts.  One example of such a large or even infinite 
variety of OTC derivatives is the high variety of option contracts.  
As noted above, in a standard exchange option the price, transaction 
date, and underlying asset itself are fixed.  By contrast, in an OTC 
option contract, all of these characteristics can be changed in various 
ways.  As such, contracts in which these characteristics have been 
changed are called "exotic" contracts.  An exotic option contract may 
include:  (1) the use of another derivative as an underlying asset 
(e.g., swaptions, or options on swaps); (2) a choice of option type 
(put or call) by the buyer at a specific time; and (3) a set price level 
at which the option is canceled or, on the contrary, is executed.27 
As a result, OTC derivatives may be based on contracts that are 
not covered by any country’s current legislation, and therefore a 
party to such a contract will have no right to remedies in cases where 
this contract is breached.28  This is more salient for contracts gov-
erned by the legislation of civil law countries, where contract law is 
codified and all types of contracts are specified in statutes.  
2.2.2.1.2. High Level of “Derivative Leverage” 
Both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives have a special kind 
of leverage that differs from financial leverage.  In essence, deriva-
tive leverage means that the derivative transaction is not related to 
the payment of the entire value of the underlying asset.  Therefore, 
                                                     
26 Alexandra V. Galanova, Influence of the Global OTC Derivatives Market on 
the Market Risks 47 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Russian Economic 
Academy).  Alexandra Galanova defines ten such groups, whereas I address only 
those that are specific to OTC derivatives market and that I consider the most plau-
sible and relevant for the purposes of this Article.   
27 Id. at 48–50. 
28 Id. at 48–49. 
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a positive difference in the prices (rates) is matched not with the en-
tire value of the asset, but only with the amounts advanced in the 
market of its derivative.  In other words, the return from transac-
tions involving assets in the derivatives market is charged against a 
smaller amount of capital than in the physical market, where the en-
tire value of the asset is paid.  Thus, the rate of return on the deriva-
tives market is always higher than in the physical market.29  Profes-
sor Frank Partnoy, a former derivatives trader, also notes that OTC 
derivatives are frequently used to create excessive amounts of un-
warranted leverage.30 
One unique feature of the OTC derivative is that the level of de-
rivative leverage is even higher than on the exchange market be-
cause the OTC market does not employ the use of a central counter-
party, and there are therefore no margin requirements.  For instance, 
in order to conclude a swap contract, there could be no requirement 
for depositing any amounts in advance.  Payments received by one 
party under the swap contract are usually charged only against its 
pay-offs, which are usually also broken in time.  Derivative leverage 
obviously increases the number of open positions in the market with 
the same amount of equity.  However, in the event of adverse 
changes in market prices (rates), or of the improper use of derivative 
(or financial) leverage, such leverage can cause significant growth in 
losses, i.e., accelerated growth of risk.31  Finally, the synergy of de-
rivative leverage and minimal, if any, capital requirements can in-
crease market volatility and the level of systemic risk.32 
Certainly, the level of derivative leverage may vary depending 
on the specific type of derivative.  Therefore, corporate risk policies 
should be customized to the specific derivatives and levels of lever-
age that a certain company uses.33 
                                                     
29 Id. at 52–53. 
30 Frank Partnoy, Op-Ed., Danger in Wall Street's Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/opinion/ 
15partnoy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B8RL-RCJC].  
31 Galanova, supra note 26, at 53–54. 
32 Baker, supra note 24, at 1307. 
33 Scalcione, supra note 7, at 71. 
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One of the very prominent features of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket is its relative opacity compared to the highly transparent ex-
change market.  This opacity results from the strictly bilateral nature 
of transactions on, and the absence of central counterparty systems 
in, the OTC derivatives market.  The need for a high degree of trans-
parency arises from the large number of the OTC market partici-
pants, as well as from the high volume of trade. 
This opacity can create market uncertainty, particularly in times 
of unstable market conditions.  Parties using OTC derivatives to 
hedge certain risks cannot simply understand the true reliability of 
their hedges if their counterparty's exposures are not clear.  There-
fore, a market participant who is unaware of its counterparty’s cred-
ibility could hedge one risk, but assume a disproportionate amount 
of counterparty risk.34  
The OTC market’s lack of transparency also makes it difficult for 
regulators to obtain adequate information to oversee these markets, 
as regulators do not know the exact size of any particular segment 
of the OTC derivatives market.  Moreover, as the OTC derivatives 
market is global, regulators usually do not know the precise break-
down of the counterparties’ positions within the companies they 
regulate, which may force them to seek such information outside of 
their jurisdiction.35  Finally, the OTC market’s opacity prevents reg-
ulators from identifying risks at early stages and eliminating or mit-
igating them.36  
2.2.2.1.4. Decentralized Market Infrastructure 
The OTC derivatives market has much greater decentralization 
and less self-regulation than the exchange market, which is regu-
lated not only by states but also by exchanges themselves.  The OTC 
derivatives market is highly decentralized as its participants negoti-
ate independently, while exchange-traded derivative transactions 
take place only on an exchange.  Unlike exchange markets, the OTC 
                                                     
34 Baker, supra note 24, at 1306.  
35 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENT TO 
THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
ON OTC DERIVATIVES, CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND TRADE REPOSITORIES 14–15 
(2010) [hereinafter Impact Assesment].  
36 Baker, supra note 24, at 1306. 
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market is informal in terms of both regulatory issues and trading 
management and oversight.37 
However, it would be unfair to characterize the OTC market as 
absolutely decentralized because regulators in different countries 
and self-regulatory organizations still find ways to influence it.  For 
example, there are various organizations including the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) that are designed to 
improve the operation of the OTC market.  Such associations work 
out recommendations aimed to standardize financial records, assist 
in the effective management of risk, assess regulatory and opera-
tional risks, and initiate voluntary disclosure of OTC derivative 
transactions.38 
On the one hand, market decentralization is one of the most at-
tractive attributes of OTC transactions to market participants.  On 
the other hand, since the OTC derivative transactions are negotiated 
without a centralized clearing system, margin requirements, and re-
strictions (limits) on the value of open positions, the market partici-
pants have to manage credit risk on their own.  Hence, risk manage-
ment in the OTC market is also decentralized.39  
Organizational imperfection of the global OTC market infra-
structure inevitably leads to a relative increase of risks on it due to 
the: 
• Lack of professional organizations that specialize in servic-
ing settlements under OTC derivative contracts, which 
would reduce the associated risks of the market;  
• Lack of uniform rules for settlements and performance 
guarantees on OTC derivatives (these rules and guarantees 
may vary from transaction to transaction and from one mar-
ket maker to another);  
• Inconsistencies, differences, and gaps in the national legis-
lation of different countries regarding the obligations that 
must be fulfilled under these instruments.40 
                                                     
37 Galanova, supra note 26, at 57–59. 
38 Id. at 60. 
39 Id. at 59. 
40 Id. at 85. 
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2.2.2.2. OTC Market Generated Risks 
The aforementioned features of the OTC market infrastructure 
can reduce the effectiveness of market discipline and create instabil-
ity in the market, having a negative impact on the dynamics of mar-
ket prices.  These features therefore directly contribute to the follow-
ing market risks. 
2.2.2.2.1. Counterparty (Credit) Risk 
Counterparty risk denotes the possibility that the counterparty 
may default on its obligations under a derivative contract.  For ex-
change-traded instruments, there is a central clearinghouse that 
guarantees to all market participants that their transactions will be 
accomplished, regardless of counterparty default.41  Moreover, val-
uation on the exchange market takes place almost every day, which 
is much more frequent than on the OTC market.42  Counterparty risk 
is difficult to manage due to the following flaws of the OTC market:  
(1) the lack of information on the counterparty in the transaction; (2) 
the absence of a uniform risk management and control system; (3) 
unreliability of the existing risk measuring and modeling methods.43 
The lack of information about the counterparty results from:  (1) 
the need to preserve the counterparty’s trade secrets; (2) constant 
changes in the counterparty’s economic activity, rapidly rendering 
past information about the counterparty obsolete; (3) changes in the 
methods of market risks calculation, which often requires new in-
formation.44  Infrequent valuation of exposures combined with a 
high degree of leverage may lead to large margin calls in case of 
                                                     
41 Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the 
Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1047 (1994). 
42 However, reconciliation frequency had a positive tendency in the last few 
years according to ISDA Margin Surveys.  In 2014, larger portfolios showed an in-
creased rate of portfolio reconciliation versus 2013.  INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES 
ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2014 24 (2014) available at http://www2.isda.org/ 
functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/ [http://perma.cc/R5QW-
GD7W].  Moreover, in 2010 dealers performed daily reconciliation on 56% of their 
trades, while in 2014 larger firms reconciled 84% of all portfolios on a daily basis.  
Id.; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2010 12 (2010) available 
at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/ 
[http://perma.cc/R5QW-GD7W]. 
43 Galanova, supra note 26, at 86. 
44 Id. 
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sudden price changes, which may result in high costs for the party 
receiving the margin call or may even lead to its default.45 
The main drawback of the OTC market related to risk manage-
ment is that every market participant needs to have its own risk 
management system since OTC derivatives participants deal di-
rectly with each other without the benefit of an exchange clearing-
house.  The operation and maintenance of such a system, where each 
participant manages its own risk, is quite expensive.  In addition, 
the overall effectiveness and “defensive” capabilities of such a sys-
tem are always limited.  On the exchange market, this burden is car-
ried by the clearinghouse, which is much less expensive for market 
participants.46  Moreover, the differences in the risk models used 
may lead to collateral disputes between counterparties.47 
Issues of the reliability of the risk measuring and modeling 
methods are common for both the exchange and OTC derivatives as 
they rely on the development of the relevant areas of economic sci-
ence.  However, the OTC market has its specific reliability issues, as 
risk management is concentrated within the separate companies, 
which often have insufficient resources for the task.  Therefore, their 
methods can significantly lag behind those applied by larger finan-
cial institutions.48  Moreover, in order to evaluate counterparty risk, 
a market participant must determine the cost of replacing the con-
tract in the event of counterparty’s default, which requires modeling 
the volatility of both the underlying and related fluctuations.49  Such 
measuring of volatility is usually very subjective, as it “depends on 
judgment and personal opinion about what the future will look 
like.”50  
Finally, the long-term nature of OTC derivatives contracts also 
increases the risk of default by the counterparty.  The OTC market 
                                                     
45 Impact Assessment, supra note 25, § 3.1.4.3 (remarking on the problems 
caused by under-collateralization of contracts, which increases parties’ leverage, as 
well as the infrequent valuation of that collateral and the resulting exposures). 
46 Galanova, supra note 26, at 87. 
47 Impact Assessment, supra note 25, § 3.1.4.3 (noting that different models can 
lead to different valuations of derivative contracts and thus lead to conflicts as to 
the amount of collateral that secures that contract). 
48 Id. 
49 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1048. 
50 Kenneth S. Leong, Estimates, Guesstimates and Rules of Thumb, in FROM BLACK-
SCHOLES TO BLACK-HOLES: NEW FRONTIERS IN OPTIONS 63, 67 (1992). 
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participants often have to rely on each other's financial credibility 
for many years.51   
2.2.2.2.2. Liquidity Risk 
While exchange-traded derivatives have a very high degree of 
liquidity, OTC derivatives are less liquid.  This is partly due to the 
non-standardized nature of OTC contracts, which are often individ-
ualized and tailored to specific market participants.  Therefore, it is 
very difficult for parties to liquidate such a contract before it expires.  
In addition, the OTC market has no centralized infrastructure that 
would provide liquidity.  
The non-standard character of OTC derivative contracts makes 
them non-fungible.  Market participants that wish to close a position 
have to go back to the original counterparty (and usually make a 
deal).  This gives the dealer a certain amount of market power—and 
hence, pricing power.  Market participants could alternatively enter 
into an opposite position with a different counterparty in order to 
eliminate the liquidity risk; however, it would not eliminate coun-
terparty risk.52 
Another reason for low liquidity is the long-term duration of 
OTC contracts, which are usually concluded in five or more years.  
Such long-term obligations cannot easily be altered in the event of 
dramatic changes in the market.  The rigidity caused by the lack of 
premature liquidation options increases the credit risk of such con-
tracts.  By contrast, short-term obligations specific to exchange de-
rivatives allow for these derivatives to have high liquidity, as they 
correspond to changing market conditions.  
2.2.2.2.3. Price Risk 
The pricing of privately negotiated OTC derivatives is less trans-
parent than that of exchange-traded standardized instruments.  The 
prices of OTC derivatives are usually determined by impenetrable 
formulas.  One or both parties of an OTC derivative transaction may 
not fully understand the terms of the contract they have negotiated.  
                                                     
52 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1048. 
52 COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., ENSURING EFFICIENT, SAFE AND SOUND 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 3.1.3 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ mar-
ket/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/report_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5QW-
GD7W]. 
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Such complexity of an OTC transaction creates incentives for price 
manipulation.53  A remarkable example of such manipulation is the 
case between Procter & Gamble Co. and Bankers Trust and Co., in 
which the latter kept its counterparty in the dark about key aspects 
of the derivatives sold.  This was revealed by a taped conversation 
of its employees discussing a leveraged derivative deal the bank had 
sold to Procter & Gamble Co.54  
Another concern regarding the price of OTC derivatives is that 
it could be affected by external factors not foreseen by the contract-
ing parties.  Without a clearinghouse to determine the price, coun-
terparties are usually left to argue the effect that such external fac-
tors should have on them.55 
2.2.2.2.4. Operational Risk 
An OTC derivatives transaction goes through several processing 
stages before it is confirmed and completed.  During the term of an 
OTC derivative contract, several single (e.g., termination) or recur-
ring (e.g., settlement of payments) events may take place that need 
to be managed.  In order to efficiently manage these events, a very 
high level of automation is needed, the availability of which, in gen-
eral, directly correlates with the level of contract standardization, 
i.e., the higher the level of standardization, the more automated pro-
cesses are available.56 
As mentioned earlier, unlike standardized exchange derivatives, 
OTC derivatives are customizable, with room for a high degree of 
flexibility in the terms and conditions of contracts.  Therefore, they 
require substantial involvement of human resources in certain 
stages of contract performance.  Such intervention becomes particu-
larly problematic when the transaction volumes increase enor-
mously.  As a result, low levels of standardization and automation 
lead to the increase of operational risk, i.e., the risk of loss due to 
                                                     
53 Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 681 (2002) (advocating that if OTC transactions are 
complex, fraud and abuse are likely). 
54 Kelley Holland et al., The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, 
http://www.businessweek.com/1995/42/b34461.htm [http://perma.cc/6KXL-
TTYE]. 
55 Eppel, supra note 54, at 682 (remarking that parties are left to dispute 
amongst each other the effects of these factors). 
56 Impact Assessment, supra note 35, § 3.1.5.1. 
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2016] FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES 963 
 
 
incompetent or failed internal and/or external processes.  This may 
also lead to the increase of other risks, e.g., legal risk or even coun-
terparty (credit) risk.  For instance, the failure to confirm a transac-
tion because of lack of automation may pose a threat to its enforcea-
bility or the capability to net it against other transactions.57 
2.2.2.2.5. Systemic Risk 
One of the main concerns about OTC derivatives among special-
ists is the fact that they are a source of systemic risk.  There are many 
various approaches to understanding and defining such risk.  Alan 
Greenspan fairly observed that although “[i]t is generally agreed 
that systemic risk represents a propensity for some sort of financial 
system disruption, . . .  one observer might use the term ‘market fail-
ure’ to describe what another would deem to have been a market 
outcome that was natural and healthy, even if harsh.”58  As a result, 
the “very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat unsettled.”59  
However, the general underlying idea is that systemic risk is the risk 
that a given system that is adversely affected by an economic shock 
(systemic event) such as market or institutional failure may trigger 
the failure or significant losses of other markets or institutions, 
which is caused or exacerbated by distrust or loss of confidence in 
the stability of the system.60  The systemic event may lead to various 
significant consequences,61 and OTC derivatives have several ele-
ments and features that may increase the systemic risk.   
                                                     
57 Id. § 3.1.5.3. 
58 George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 
CATO J. 17, 21 n.5 (1996) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at a Research Conference on Risk Measurement and 
Systemic Risk 7 (Nov. 16, 1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ jour-
nal/cj16n-2.html [http://perma.cc/A6VU-D6ZW]). 
59 Id. 
60 See Scalcione, supra note 7, at 93; Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 193, 203 (2008) (describing an example of a company’s systemic risk that was 
caused by its exposure to other actors in the market).  
61 The consequences of a systemic event are discussed further in this article in 
relation to the financial crisis in 2008. 
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Most OTC derivatives transactions are not secured.62  This cre-
ates the risk that the failure of one significant market participant to 
make payments could result in its counterparty's delay of payments 
and cause a quick transfer of defaults to other market participants63 
or even to other markets, including non-financial ones due to their 
interconnectedness.  Such a chain reaction is known as the “domino 
effect.”64  Systemic risk is increased even more by the fact that the 
OTC derivatives business is concentrated among a small number of 
market players using similar derivatives strategies.65  Thus, the fail-
ure of one of these players would likely have adverse systemic ef-
fects.  The systemic risk is further aggravated by the long-term na-
ture of the OTC transactions.66 
There is another concern regarding the use of certain trading 
strategies such as dynamic hedging, which involves adjusting a 
hedge as the underlying asset value changes (often several times a 
day).  As such strategies are based on “an unrealistic assumption of 
liquidity,”67 they can fail in the case of poor market conditions, caus-
ing the parties to default and further triggering overall market melt-
down. 
The “Too Big to Fail” concept could be an additional factor in-
centivizing market participants to increase risk taking, as the likeli-
hood of government interference is almost guaranteed if the default 
of a particular company seems to be large and significant.  Unfortu-
nately, the taxpayers have to bear the burden of bailing out such 
huge financial entities in order to prevent a financial meltdown. 
Finally, it is important to note that today financial markets are 
no longer domestic, and transactions all over the world are highly 
interconnected.  The OTC market is certainly not an exception to this 
                                                     
62 William Glasgall & Bill Javetski, Swap Fever: Big Money, Big Risks, BUS. WEEK, 
June 1, 1992, at 102, 103 (noting that most OTC derivatives transactions are “unse-
cured and exposed to ever-more-volatile interest-rate, currency, and futures mar-
kets”). 
63 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1055. 
64 Scalcione, supra note 8, at 87. 
65 Id. at 98–99. 
66 See Claire Makin, Hedging Your Derivatives Doubts, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, 
Dec. 1991, at 113, 119 (describing OTC transactions as private contracts that rely on 
bank counterparties, which is not problematic for short terms but can create con-
cern when stretched to longer terms). 
67 Waldman, supra note 41, at 1056. 
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globalization.  This requires regulation and oversight not just at the 
level of a particular country, but globally.  Therefore, the systemic 
risk associated with OTC derivatives is also aggravated by the lack 
of cooperation among regulators of different countries. 
2.2.3. Benefits vs. Costs 
The risks, or potential costs, posed by OTC derivatives seem far 
greater than the benefits such instruments give.  Therefore, the use 
of OTC derivatives may be appropriate only if they are comprehen-
sively regulated.  However, prior to defining how exactly they have 
to be regulated, we may want to see the risks created by the use of 
OTC derivatives in practice.  
2.3. The Role of OTC Derivatives in the Financial Crisis 
In previous sections, we discussed various threats that OTC de-
rivatives may pose, but only in theory, not in practice.  One may 
fairly argue that, in theory, all financial instruments bear some level 
of risk, even government securities (very unlikely, but still possible).  
It seems that specialists took this same view of OTC derivatives, ar-
guing that the world had changed and the risks exposed by deriva-
tives would never materialize.  Otherwise, it is hard to explain the 
level of carelessness with regard to OTC derivatives prior to 2008.  
However, this view was decisively discredited by the financial crisis 
of 2008, when many companies involved in large amounts of OTC 
transactions suffered huge losses or simply went bankrupt.  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the US and then spread 
all over the world has become a serious challenge for the modern 
global economic system and caused significant structural changes to 
it.  The negative role of derivatives, as will be shown further, is often 
cited as the main reason of the crisis by both economists and finance 
specialists.  Besides, several years before the crisis of 2008, Warren 
Buffett expressed his concerns about derivatives, calling them finan-
cial weapons of mass destruction with latent, but potentially lethal, 
dangers.68  
In our opinion, the crisis was caused by a whole range of factors, 
both financial (such as the large and unregulated OTC market) and 
                                                     
68 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2002), available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/V4SX-LNR9]. 
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economic (such as the fall in real estate prices).  The synergy of these 
factors led to the deterioration of the developed economies.  How-
ever, for the purposes of this Article—to understand how exactly 
unregulated OTC derivatives can adversely affect the economy, we 
mainly address only their role in the crisis of 2008.  
2.3.1. Regulation prior to 2008 
Before discussing the specific OTC derivatives cases of 2008 and 
trying to show their consequences, it seems appropriate to present 
the general regulatory picture right before the financial meltdown.  
This section will first illustrate the development of OTC market reg-
ulation in the world’s major economies.  This analysis will allow for 
a better understanding of the reasons why those cases related to de-
rivatives actually happened during the financial crisis, what could 
have been done to prevent them, and, therefore, what regulation 
seems to be appropriate.    
2.3.1.1. United States 
In the US, OTC derivatives were not highly regulated before the 
financial crisis of 2008.69  For many years, the US legal system made 
a distinction in terms of the enforceability of agreements intended 
to hedge a certain risk (i.e., when at least one of the parties was try-
ing to reduce risk) and speculative contracts:  the former were en-
forceable in the courts while the latter were not.70  However, deriv-
atives speculators resolved the problem of enforcement by trading 
in private venues that enforced their contracts—the commodity ex-
changes.71  
The first attempt to regulate derivatives was made in 1922, with 
the enactment of the Grain Futures Act, which was reenacted as the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) in 1936.72  The CEA had two key 
                                                     
69 Frank D'Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets: Pro-
posed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 476–77 (2010). 
70 Stout, supra note 10, at 11 (describing this conceptual difference and noting 
that the test often employed was whether either party actually owned or planned 
to own at some point the asset that was the subject of the contract). 
71 Id. at 14–15. 
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provisions:  (1) it authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (“CFTC”) to oversee and regulate private commodity ex-
changes and (2) it required that all futures contracts be traded on a 
regulated exchange.73  Thus, the CEA ensured that speculative de-
rivatives on the prices of commodities be traded on organized and 
regulated exchanges. 
However, speculators found other ways to profit, such as by bet-
ting on interest and currency rates, housing prices, or inflation.74  By 
the 1980's, an alternative type of futures contracts was developed, 
usually referred to as “swaps.”75  Initially, the CFTC defined swaps 
as “an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash 
flows measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or prices 
with payment calculated by reference to a principal base (notional 
amount).”76  Essentially, the question arose whether such contracts 
would be subject to the mandatory exchange trading under the CEA.  
The CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA exchange-trading re-
quirement by issuing a 1989 Policy Statement declaring that swaps 
must be “negotiated by the parties as to their material terms, based 
upon individualized credit determinations, and documented by the 
parties in an agreement or series of agreements that is not fully 
standardized.”77  As the CEA did not empower the CFTC to grant 
exemptions from the CEA's exchange-trading requirement, in order 
to avoid ambiguity, Congress gave the CFTC such authority in 
1992.78  Soon after, in 1993, the CFTC used its new power and ex-
empted from the CEA's exchange-trading requirement those trans-
actions that were, inter alia, “not part of a fungible class of agree-
ments that are standardized as to their material economic terms” 
                                                     
73 § 4a–4b, 49 Stat. at 1492–94.  There was an exception for hedge-to-arrive con-
tracts that contemplated actual delivery and were thus “cash forward contracts” 
outside the scope of the CEA.  
74 See Stout, supra note 10, at 19 (listing various market characteristics that 
could be bet on and chronicling the rise of swaps related to interest rates). 
75 Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with 
Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank's Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused 
by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 
131–32 (2011) (hereinafter Overwhelming). 
76 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694–95 (July 
21, 1989). 
77 Id. at 30, 969. 
78 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 
3590, 3629–32. 
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and “not entered into and traded on or through a multilateral trans-
action execution facility.”79 
What followed over the next five years were several cases of 
companies suffering significant losses speculating through OTC de-
rivatives:  Proctor & Gamble Co. (157 million US dollars) in 1994,80 
Orange County Fund (2.5 billion US dollars) in 1995,81 and Long 
Term Capital Management (survived only with a 4 billion dollar 
government bailout) in 1998.82  As a result, in May 1998, the CFTC 
issued a concept release stating that “it [was] appropriate to reex-
amine its regulatory approach to the OTC derivatives market taking 
into account developments since 1993”83 and proposing certain re-
strictions.  However, the other financial agencies (the SEC, the Fed-
eral Reserve, and the Treasury)—members of the President’s Work-
ing Group—were opposed to the CFTC’s proposals, and that led to 
Congress enacting legislation to limit the CFTC's authority to regu-
late OTC derivatives.84 
The last and most important regulatory action regarding OTC 
derivatives before the 2008 crisis was the enactment of the Commod-
ity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”).85  The CFMA ex-
empted OTC derivatives from all exchange trading requirements 
under the CEA, subject to the following conditions:  that both parties 
to the transaction are “eligible contract participants” and that the 
                                                     
79 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b), (d) (2009). 
80 See Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take a Charge to Close 
Out Two Interest-Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3 (examining Procter & 
Gamble’s losses from OTC derivatives).  
81 See Laura Jereski, Orange County Fund Losses Put at $2.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 12, 1994, at A3 (measuring the losses to the Orange County Fund at $2.5 bil-
lion). 
82 See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED 
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 261 (2003) (describing how LTCM only survived from its 
derivative bets due to a government bailout). 
83 Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115–16 (May 12, 
1998). 
84 See THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 12–15 (1999), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf 
[perma.cc/5DQE-DB38] (explaining the need to limit the CFTC’s ability to regulate 
OTC derivatives). 
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execution (or trading) of the transaction itself occurs outside a trad-
ing facility. 86  
2.3.1.2. European Union 
Derivative market regulation in the EU was historically much 
lighter than in the US.  For instance, there were no position limits on 
market participants, neither in national regulation nor in the rules 
applied by exchanges.87  Moreover, before the financial crisis of 2008, 
no supranational European regulation existed since OTC deriva-
tives were not regulated separately from other derivatives in most 
countries.  Rather, a system of self-regulation was implemented in 
different national laws that governed OTC derivative markets by a 
very limited group of actors, such as ISDA, Group of 30,88 and the 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group.89 
However, certain European countries used to have legislation on 
OTC derivatives that has gone through several regulatory changes.  
For instance, the United Kingdom was the world’s leading jurisdic-
tion involved in OTC derivatives trading in 2007 (right before the 
crisis). 90  Like the CFMA in the US, the U.K. Financial Services and 
Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA)91 largely exempted most derivatives 
                                                     
86 Id. § 103.  In general, for any business entity or individual to be an “eligible 
contract participant” had to have total assets exceeding 10,000,000 US dollars with 
some exceptions requiring lesser amounts in the case of using the OTC derivative 
as an instrument for risk management.  Id. § 101. 
87 See, e.g., PETER GIBBON, COMMODITY DERIVATIVES: FINANCIALIZATION AND 
REGULATORY REFORM 17–18 (2013), available at http://www.diis.dk/files/media/ 
publications/import/extra/commodity_derivatives_web_wp_2013.pdf 
[perma.cc/L8NM-66SF] (examining the relatively meager set of regulations regard-
ing position limits in the EU). 
88 A private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior represent-
atives of the private and public sectors and academia. 
89 See JOHANNES PETRY, REGULATORY CAPTURE, CIVIL SOCIETY & GLOBAL FINANCE 
IN DERIVATIVE REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMODITY DERIVATIVE REGULATION IN 
EUROPE 11–12 (2014), available at http://reggov2014.ibei.org/bcn-14-papers/16-
140.pdf [perma.cc/7EZC-XRZN] (examining the regulations in countries through-
out Europe on the subject of derivatives and the parties involved). 
90 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, SURVEY, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2007 19–12 (2007), available at https://www.bis. 
org/publ/rpfxf07t.pdf [perma.cc/2ZSH-EKXM] (comparing different countries’ 
banking activities in 2007). 
91 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (U.K.). 
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transactions from regulatory oversight.92  Nonetheless, some regu-
lation remained, and instead of prohibiting certain OTC derivative 
transactions, the United Kingdom imposed restrictions on which 
parties were allowed to transact in OTC derivatives.93  Moreover, 
the parties were required to comply with certain requirements, in-
cluding maintaining capital and risk controls and disclosing all OTC 
derivatives trading to regulators.94  Capital maintenance require-
ments were the most common and likely the only restrictions in the 
leading European countries as of 1999 according to the CFTC’s sur-
vey.95  
Thus, both the US and Europe lacked a comprehensive regula-
tory framework prior to the 2008 financial crisis.  The lack of such a 
framework resulted in the formation of a large OTC derivatives mar-
ket with almost no oversight and high systemic risk.96  This market 
was very sensitive to the dramatic changes in the global economy 
that would take place during the crisis. 
2.3.2. Impact of OTC Derivatives on the Crisis of 2008  
Various factors caused the financial crisis, but unregulated de-
rivatives played a unique role.  There is still no consensus among 
finance specialists and legal and economic scholars on the impact of 
OTC derivatives on the global economy in 2008.  
The most extensive debates took place in the US, where the crisis 
initially started.  For instance, Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, 
noted, “[T]he over-the-counter derivatives marketplace was in fact 
part and parcel” of the financial crisis in 2008.97  Mr. Gensler had 
                                                     
92 See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case 
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 639, 661 (2010) (studying how 
the United Kingdom ceded its duty to regulate Credit Default Swaps and the effects 
of that decision). 
93 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, REGULATION OF OVER-THE-
COUNTER DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS 7–8 (1999) (describing the existing regulations 
of OTC derivatives in countries around the world in 1999). 
94 Id. at xi. 
95 Id. at vii–xvii. 
95 Id. at vii–xvii. 
96 See Chander, supra note 93, at 649–50 (demonstrating the risks in the market 
and its effects following the financial crisis). 
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many times claimed, prior to the reforms, that OTC derivatives were 
not regulated enough and could pose risks to the financial system.98  
Michael Greenberger, professor at University of Maryland School of 
Law, goes even further, stating that “the darkness of this huge multi-
trillion dollar unregulated [OTC derivatives] market not only 
caused, but substantially aggravated, the financial crisis.”99  
On the contrary, many other specialists deny a cause-and-effect 
relationship between OTC derivatives and the financial crisis.  For 
example, Steven W. Kohlhagen, former professor of International Fi-
nance at UC Berkeley, testified that OTC derivatives had “absolutely 
no role whatsoever in causing the financial crisis.”100  It is also nec-
essary to mention Lynn A. Stout, one of the most radical persons 
regarding OTC derivatives regulation, who does not accept the per-
ception of the crisis as an economic phenomenon, instead focusing 
on the legal decisions that led to the crisis.101  In Stout’s opinion, the 
crisis was caused by the removal of legal constraints on speculative 
trading in OTC derivatives by the CFMA in 2000.102  
Despite the absence of unanimity regarding the role of OTC de-
rivatives in the crisis of 2008, almost all specialists always 
acknowledge the following factors did have a major role in the crisis:  
(1) the adverse role of credit default swaps (CDS) and (2) the sys-
temic risk derived from all OTC derivatives.  These are the main fac-
tors suggesting the impact of OTC derivatives on the economy in 
2008 and showing how the risks connected with them can material-
ize. 
                                                     
98 Id. 
99 The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing before the Fin. Crisis In-
quiry Comm’n 21 (2010) (testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor, 
University of Maryland School of Law), available at http://cybercemetery. 
unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175404/http://c0182412.cdn1.cloudfiles.rack-
spacecloud.com/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf [perma.cc/M9CU-SHLR] [hereinafter 
Testimony]. 
100 The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis In-
quiry Comm’n 1 (2010) (testimony of Steven W. Kohlhagen, Former Professor of In-
ternational Finance, University of California, Berkeley) available at http://cy-
bercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310175228/http://c0182412.cdn1.cloudfi
les.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0630-Kohlhagen.pdf [perma.cc/VHW6-R8CU]. 
101 Stout, supra note 10, at 4. 
102 Id. 
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2.3.2.1. Credit Default Swaps 
In June 2008, the notional value of the unregulated OTC market 
was estimated to be over 680 trillion US dollars with almost 60 tril-
lion of CDSs.103  Many specialists agree that the unregulated multi-
trillion dollar CDS market adversely affected the global economy 
during the 2008 crisis.  The SEC Chairman at that time, Christopher 
Cox, dubbed the CDS market a “regulatory black hole” that needed 
“immediate legislative action.”104  Even those who supported dereg-
ulation of derivatives by the CFMA—former SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt and former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan in-
cluded—have admitted to the responsibility of the CDS market de-
regulation for the 2008 economic crisis.105  
What is a CDS and how does it work?  A CDS is a contract under 
which one party (protection buyer) will pay an annual fee to another 
party (protection seller) either until the maturation of the contract or 
until a credit event (loan default or other event)106 occurs on an un-
derlying party that bears the credit risk of the contract (reference en-
tity).107  If such a credit event occurs, the buyer will deliver bonds or 
loans of that reference entity for the notional value of the contract to 
the seller and will receive compensation (usually the face value of 
loan or of other obligation) in return (as shown on GRAPH 1).108  In 
other words, CDSs serve as a mechanism for insuring the financial 
                                                     
103 See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF 2008 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_ 
hy0811.pdf [perma.cc/RD8K-PP3A] (showing the incredible size of the OTC deriv-
atives market at the height of its market share). 
104 Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/30/AR2008123003431.html [perma.cc/GG7N-
EQW3]. 
105 See Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/                
economy/09greenspan.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/U3PT-64S8] (demonstrat-
ing the lasting effects of the boom years under Greenspan as Federal Reserve Chair-
man that ultimately led to the Financial Crisis in 2008). 
106 Events considered as default could be, inter alia: (1) non-repayment of a loan 
at maturity, (2) breach of contract, and (3) declaration of bankruptcy. 
107 See COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., supra note 53, § 3.1.1–3.1.3 (describing 
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viability of certain obligations by paying a “premium” for such in-
surance.109  
 
GRAPH 1. CDS STRUCTURE 
 
 However, by using the term “swaps,” CDS fell into the regula-
tory “black hole”—no agency had direct oversight authority over 
them after they were deregulated by the CFMA’s.110  The same can 
be fairly inferred in relation to the situation in Europe and Russia, 
where swaps regulation was almost absolutely absent during that 
time.  Thus, there were no regulatory requirements in place before 
the crisis that could have prevented the catastrophe. 
To more precisely delineate the CDS’s role in the 2008 crisis, it is 
worth describing in brief the housing securities market situation 
first.  The securitization of mortgage loans results in mortgage 
backed securities (“MBSs”) that derive their value and payments 
from a pool of underlying mortgages.  An MBS pools payments from 
individual underlying mortgages and distributes the pool of cash 
and payments to investors, packaged as collateralized debt obliga-
tions (“CDOs”), in tranches ranked by seniority and risk level.  CDSs 
                                                     
109 Testimony, supra note 100, at 14. 
110 Id. 
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were widely used for “insurance” of CDOs but several misunder-
standings by the market participants led to the market crash.  First, 
the issuers of CDSs believed that housing prices would always go 
up, and therefore issuance of a CDS was considered “risk free.”  Due 
to this assumption, they tried to issue as many CDSs as possible.  
Second, after the housing market collapsed, and the default events 
provided for in the CDS occurred, it turned out that the undertaken 
risk was significantly undervalued.  Third, as each CDO was con-
sidered to be protected by CDS insurance, the demand for MBSs that 
sourced CDOs was constantly growing.  Fourth, the lack of CDS 
market transparency meant that regulators could not discover that 
CDSs were not secure enough.  Finally, under the wrong assump-
tion of CDS being absolutely risk-free and due to the high demand 
for them, the issuers began to write “naked” CDS to buyers who did 
not hold the loan instrument and who had no direct insurable inter-
est in the loan, i.e., who had no risk for MBSs or CDOs.  Essentially, 
this allowed traders to speculate on the creditworthiness of refer-
ence entities and such CDSs were also used to create synthetic long 
and short positions in the reference entity.111 
A very illustrative example of the CDS use is the case of Ameri-
can International Group, Inc. (“AIG”).  Before the financial crisis, 
AIG underwrote huge amounts of CDSs on CDOs.  However, 
whereas many banks and other issuers of CDSs usually hedged their 
short positions in CDS with long positions in other CDSs, AIG was 
never on both sides of the CDS transactions.112  Meanwhile, the size 
of its exposure to CDSs was approaching 440 billion US dollars be-
fore the crisis, which exceeded what it could pay in the event that 
CDOs defaulted.113  After the housing market crash and subprime 
mortgage borrowers defaulted, the value of CDOs became remark-
                                                     
111 See Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Before 
the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 11–35 (2008) (statement of Erik Sirri, Di-
rector, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts101508ers.htm 
[perma.cc/3GCT-PPPP] (explaining the rampant speculation and modification that 
had become commonplace in the market). 
112 See Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sep. 18, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apart-
idUSMAR85972720080918 [perma.cc/X6QB-KA68] (describing how AIG’s one-
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ably low.  At that point, AIG had already insured more than 441 bil-
lion US dollars of fixed-income investments held by the world's 
leading institutions, including 57.8 billion US dollars in paper re-
lated to subprime mortgages.114  Counterparties who had bought 
CDS protection from AIG also demanded insurance payouts.  All 
this, along with increased collateral requirements due to the lower-
ing of its credit ratings by major agencies, made AIG face liquidity 
issues.  It did not have enough cash and other liquid assets to fulfill 
its pending obligations.  As we all know, the story ended with the 
180 billion US dollar government bailout of AIG.  AIG’s downfall is 
a typical case of the counterparty, liquidity, and price risks posed by 
OTC derivatives in practice. 
Thus, the AIG story explicitly shows how the risks posed by 
complex instruments can materialize due to the lack of proper reg-
ulatory requirements, i.e., (1) exchange trading that could make CDS 
trading and pricing more transparent and adequate; (2) clearing in 
order to secure parties’ capital maintenance; or at least (3) reporting 
that could send regulators “red flags” before the market collapses.    
2.3.2.2. Interconnectedness: Systemic Risk Derived from All 
OTC Derivatives 
Only a truly systemic risk can pose a threat to the entire financial 
system.115  As discussed earlier, OTC derivatives can be the source 
of such systemic risk.  Unregulated OTC derivatives contributed to 
the formation of an environment of opaque and uncontrolled rela-
tions between: (1) financial institutions, (2) financial markets, and (3) 
financial and non-financial markets.116    
The most explicit evidence of the ability of OTC derivatives to 
create systemic risk could be observed at the level of the financial 
                                                     
114 See George White & Peter Moreira, Fed Lends AIG $85 Billion, Takes Control, 
AM. LAW. (Sep. 17, 2008),  http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202424584749/ 
Fed-Lends-AIG-85-Billion-Takes-Control#ixzz3MIMqAFHQ [perma.cc/F5KY-
YY5H] (detailing how AIG had insured incredibly large amounts of subprime mort-
gages). 
115 See The Role of Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: 
Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n. 6 (2010) (testimony of Michael W. Mas-
ters, Managing Member, Masters Capital Management, LLC), available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0630-Mas-
ters.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9SZ-VHWS] (explaining that nothing short of cataclys-
mic system-wide risk can bring down the entire system). 
116 Id. 
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institutions, where there was “an interlocking web of very large ex-
posures amongst the 20 or so largest swaps dealers.”117  The situa-
tion was exacerbated by the market participants’ belief in the invin-
cibility of the system, which consisted of dealers that were 
considered “Too Big to Fail.”  Market participants recognized that 
the collapse of a system whose participants were not only signifi-
cant, but also so firmly linked, could lead to the collapse of the whole 
economy.  Therefore, they all had confidence that the US Treasury 
would come to the rescue (a hugely expensive example of moral 
hazard).  However, some of these “immortal” companies, like Bear 
Sterns, did actually fail or, in the case of Lehman Brothers, went 
bankrupt.  These two companies are of special interest as they had 
one common aspect:  both were functioning as intermediaries for 
OTC derivatives, in particular, “swaps” trading.  
First was Bear Sterns, which recognized significant losses in its 
trading portfolios after the subprime mortgage collapse.118  As these 
portfolios served as collateral for the borrowed funds, the com-
pany’s lenders started to require more liquid collateral.  Conse-
quently, Bear Sterns had to sell more of its mortgage securities, 
which lead to a decrease in their market value.  Meanwhile, the ma-
jority of Bear Sterns’ counterparties, including those in derivatives 
transactions, terminated their operations and therefore significantly 
cut the company’s earnings.  All this made Bear Sterns suffer serious 
liquidity problems.  Nevertheless, in its essence, as SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox noted, Bear's collapse “was the result of a lack of 
confidence” and not a result of “inadequate capital.”119  
A very similar story happened to Lehman Brothers, which was 
a counterparty to 930,000 derivatives transactions at the time it filed 
for bankruptcy.120  Initially, Lehman suffered an unprecedented loss 
due to the subprime mortgage meltdown.  In 2007, it underwrote 
                                                     
117 Id. at 7. 
118 Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 183, 197 (2009).  
119 Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. to Nout 
Wellink, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision 1 (Mar. 20, 2008), availa-
ble at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48_letter.pdf [perma.cc/B9QW-
SPWJ]. 
120 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. First Creditors Section 341 Meeting, Janu-
ary 29, 2009, 19–20.  See also, GuyLaine Charles, OTC Derivative Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy: The Lehman Experience, 13 N.Y. ST. B.A. N.Y. BUS. L. J. §1:7–16 (Spring 2009) 
(examining the effects of derivatives once a company goes into bankruptcy). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
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more mortgage-backed securities than any other company did and 
its leverage ratio at that time was 31:1.121  After that, the same chain 
of events as in the cases of AIG and Bear Stearns was observed: loss 
of counterparties’ confidence, fall of stock prices and credit ratings 
resulting in demands for larger collateral and eventually leading to 
the liquidity default.  Lehman was just unlucky that it was the last 
to fall into crisis because after having bailed out Bear Stearns, Fred-
die Mac, and Fannie Mae, the government refused to rescue Leh-
man.  
When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, swaps dealers, as well 
as their customers, immediately reevaluated the creditworthiness of 
their counterparties.122  Moreover, as they were no longer sure of 
counterparties’ viability, they started to reduce counterparty expo-
sure as much as possible, regardless of relevance to subprime MBSs 
or even of swap types.  This reduction adversely affecting not only 
CDSs, but also the whole OTC market.  Furthermore, since swaps 
were used for hedging various portfolios and swap dealers were 
used to secure their exposures by using futures, the OTC market 
participants’ panicked reaction transferred to regulated exchange 
markets, including futures, stocks and bonds.  The crash in the fu-
tures market, in turn, spread to the commodities market as their pro-
ducers and users hedged their risks through futures contracts. 
Thus, the crisis demonstrated how, due to the interconnected-
ness within different financial and even non-financial markets, the 
start of a single element’s collapse could create a chain reaction 
throughout the system, previously referred to as the “domino ef-
fect.”    
2.3.2.3. Did OTC Derivatives Cause the Crisis? 
While the adverse role of OTC derivatives during the financial 
crisis is today taken as conventional wisdom, the question of 
whether they actually caused the crisis still remains unresolved.  
Nonetheless, it is important to understand their role in the crisis in 
order to assess the adequacy of current and future regulation of OTC 
derivatives. 
                                                     
121 Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Jan. 29, 
2008), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.t5Bb.htm#9mfu 
[https://perma.cc/3XPY-XJVZ]. 
122 Masters, supra note 116. 
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OTC derivatives obviously caused the formation of “virtual” 
capital, collateralized by significantly overvalued assets.  After de-
rivatives double the original debt, they then can serve as both collat-
eral and payment instruments.  On the one hand, the expansion of 
market transactions leads to the growth of profits.  On the other, the 
volume of transactions masks the primary debt, dissolving it in the 
mass-traded securities.  However, obligations do not disappear, and 
their failure creates the “domino effect” through the OTC deriva-
tives.  In addition, hedging transactions with securities via OTC de-
rivatives increases the volume of speculative obligations on the mar-
ket, while the illusion of the constant primary debt’s warranty 
increases.  Thus, the derivatives, especially synthetic ones, played 
the role of the “virtual” capital growth multiplier at the housing and 
financial markets, which, in turn, led to larger losses.123 
Moreover, the substitution of lending by various derivatives, 
collateralized by debt, allowed banks to generate new assets with 
almost no undertaking of new liabilities (deposits).  The widespread 
use of derivatives has changed the structure of the financial market: 
from a two-tiered model of a market economy consisting of cash and 
loan commitments, it adds a third level—derivatives.  That is why 
many specialists considered derivatives to be one of the main causes 
of the financial crisis.124   
It seems more plausible, however, that derivatives have become 
the tool that has transferred “overheating” from the mortgage mar-
ket to investment and insurance institutions.125  At the beginning of 
the crisis, the amount of subprime mortgages was extremely high, 
due partly to government policy designed to stimulate housing de-
mand.  Eventually, the high percentage of bad loans leads to a sig-
nificant imbalance in the economy.  Thus, within the structure of 
mortgage derivatives even a minor impairment in the value of loans 
                                                     
123 Evgeniy V. Petrenko, Derivatives Market in the World Financial System: 
Condition, Development, and Prospects 67 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Russian State Trade and Economics University) (on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Journal of International Law). 
124 Id. at 70–71. 
125 Alexey F. Sedunov, Derivatives Market in the World Economy: Features of 
Development and Transformation Direction 92 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Russian Science Academy, Institute of Economics) (on file with the University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law).  See also, Id. fig.3. 
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could carry huge losses.  This process then affected the shares of in-
vestment banks that underwrote CDSs.  More specifically, the diffi-
culties experienced by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG dur-
ing the crisis originated outside the OTC market, even though their 
exposures in the OTC derivatives market, and in particular CDS 
contracts, transferred those difficulties to other sectors of the econ-
omy. 
 
GRAPH 2: RISK TRANSFER CHAIN 
 
 
In addition, some finance specialists opine that “the financial cri-
sis would have been more severe” without the operation of the OTC 
derivatives market,126 which “continued to function effectively 
throughout the crisis, and ha[s] not been adversely affected by Leh-
man’s collapse.”127  Others, to the contrary, claim that OTC credit 
derivatives in general, and CDSs, in particular, delayed the crisis by 
allowing the housing bubble to grow and that without CDSs, there 
would have still been a financial crisis, but it would have come ear-
lier and “would have been less severe.”128  
Nevertheless, one thing is clear: the origin of the crisis lay not in 
the derivatives market, but in the economic imbalance created by 
                                                     
126 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS: IS THE EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?, 2009-10, H.L. 93, at 118. 
127 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS: IS THE EU ON THE RIGHT TRACK?, 2009-10, H.L. 93, at 20. 
128 Kohlhagen, supra note 101. 
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the “defective” mortgages, as well as in the opacity of the evaluation 
and credit ratings of MBSs, which eventually led to significant ex-
cess amount of CDSs issued over hedged loans.  
In other words, applying the old Armenian proverb, the OTC 
definitely “thundered” in the financial world, but did not actually 
bring the “rain,” even though they made it “heavier.”  
2.4. Preliminary Findings 
 The use of OTC derivatives, like the use of almost any 
other financial instrument, has certain benefits and 
costs.   
 Costs of OTC derivatives are greater than the benefits 
such instruments yield.  Therefore, the use of OTC 
derivatives may be justified only if they are compre-
hensively regulated. 
 Among the various risks posed by the OTC market, 
the core ones are the counterparty, liquidity, and sys-
temic risks created mainly by the absence of central 
clearing and reporting requirements, and by the re-
sulting lack of transparency.  
 These risks did actually materialize during the finan-
cial crisis of 2008.  However, OTC derivatives did not 
directly cause the financial crisis, which originated 
outside the OTC market. 
 It was possible for the risks associated with OTC de-
rivatives to materialize because the US as well as Eu-
rope lacked a comprehensive regulatory framework 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, in particular: (1) ex-
change trading; (2) clearing; or at least (3) reporting.    
OTC derivatives need to be regulated, but how exactly and to 
what extent?  The next Part will investigate this question, by com-
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3.  THE US AND EU REGULATION AND A MODEL FRAMEWORK 
EXPERIMENT 
In Part 2 of this Article, it was noted that the US as well as Europe 
lacked a comprehensive regulatory framework for OTC derivatives 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis.  The rapid growth of the derivative 
markets as well as the role of derivatives in the financial crisis of 
2008 have pressured governments to take immediate actions.  As a 
result, after the financial crisis spread globally, the G20 member-
states held numerous summits to find possible solutions to the crisis 
and to strengthen international cooperation in financial oversight, in 
particular in the question of OTC derivatives regulation.129  During 
these summits, the G20 countries, including the EU and the US, 
came up with general regulatory goals for their future national leg-
islation on OTC derivatives.  More precisely, the G20 Leaders agreed 
during the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009 that: 
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded 
on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appro-
priate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-
2012 at the latest.  OTC derivative contracts should be re-
ported to trade repositories.  Non-centrally cleared contracts 
should be subject to higher capital requirements.130 
In June 2010, G20 Leaders in Toronto reaffirmed their commit-
ment and committed to accelerate the implementation of strong 
measures to “improve transparency and regulatory oversight of 
over-the-counter derivatives in an internationally consistent and 
nondiscriminatory way.”131  Thus, the objective of the G20 agree-
ment was to establish a global regulatory framework for OTC deriv-
atives to avoid the possibility of a market collapse in derivatives 
such as occurred in 2008. 
3.1. Current Regulation Overview 
Both the US and the EU have taken some significant steps to im-
plement the agreements arising out of the aforementioned G20 
                                                     
129 The G20 Summits have been held in Washington (2008), in London and 
Pittsburgh (2009), and in Toronto and Seoul (2010).   
130 G20 Leader's Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 2009), supra note 3. 
131 G20 Leader's Declaration, The Toronto Summit (June 2010), available at 
https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Toronto_Declaration_eng_0.pdf.  
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meetings.  The legislation is intended to authorize various oversight 
agencies to regulate derivatives and to reduce the risk of market 
abuse in derivative markets. 
3.1.1 United States 
In July 2010, in response to the financial crisis, Congress passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd Frank Act).132  The Dodd Frank Act consists of sixteen sec-
tions regulating almost all financial industries.  In particular, Title 
VII of the Dodd Frank Act, the Wall Street Transparency and Ac-
countability Act of 2010, focuses on derivatives regulation.133  
Thus, Title VII of the Dodd Frank Act is the primary statute reg-
ulating derivatives in the US at the current time.  It created a com-
prehensive regulatory framework for the swaps market in order to 
eliminate the gap in past regulation of the market.  The objective of 
the legislation was to bring safety and transparency to the OTC mar-
ket for derivatives based on the assumption that such increased 
transparency can reduce the risks associated with derivatives such 
as counterparty risk.  The statute requires the use of clearinghouses 
or central counterparties (CCPs) for trade settlements, exchange 
trading of standardized OTC derivatives, and trade reporting of all 
OTC derivatives to a central data repository.  The legislation inte-
grated a regulatory framework for the regulation of the OTC deriv-
atives market and market participants that involves the cooperation 
of multiple national agencies.134  
3.1.2. European Union 
The EU, in response to the role OTC derivatives played during 
the financial crisis, enacted the European Markets Infrastructure 
                                                     
132 Pub. L. No 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
133 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701–74. 
134 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial 
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 
1062 (2012) (analyzing the situations whereby people have the appetite for the ap-
propriate level of financial reforms).  
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Regulation (EMIR),135 the Markets in Financial Instruments Di-
rective (MIFID II),136 and the complementary Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation (MIFIR).137 
The EMIR establishes the general regulatory framework for de-
rivatives in the EU.  The EMIR introduces a reporting requirement 
for OTC derivatives, a clearing requirement for covered OTC deriv-
atives, and mechanisms to reduce counterparty and operational 
risks for bilateral OTC derivatives.  The regulation also empowers 
national agencies to monitor and regulate the OTC derivatives mar-
ket in conjunction with the European Securities and Market Author-
ity (ESMA).  The EMIR established the business conduct standards 
and capital requirements for CCPs and other market participants. 
The MIFID II and MIFIR138 contain additional requirements on 
derivatives market structure, exemptions from regulation, and re-
quirements for derivative trading venues. 
3.2. Comparison between the US and the EU Regimes 
The regulations passed in the US and the EU concerning OTC 
derivatives have substantial similarities.  Nonetheless, differences 
exist in the American and European approaches to regulating OTC 
derivatives.  These differences developed due to various reasons: 
historical background of securities and commodities regulation, pol-
icy considerations, regulatory powers, among others. 
3.2.1.  Regulatory Authorities 
Before comparing the core of OTC derivatives regulation in the 
US and the EU, we first discuss the regulatory agencies authorized 
                                                     
135 Regulation 648/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 
2012 O.J. (L 201/1) [hereinafter EMIR]. 
136 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173/349) [hereinafter MiFID 
II].  
137 Regulation 600/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Regula-
tion 648/2012/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173/84) [hereinafter MiFIR] 
138 MIFID II and MIFIR will come into effect on January 3, 2017, and repeal 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on markets in financial instruments (MIFID). 
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to oversee the derivatives market.  The further development of reg-
ulation and maintenance of stability in the market almost com-
pletely depend on such agencies, rather than legislators, being able 
to react immediately to issues that arise.  Moreover, both the US and 
the EU approaches caused serious debates among scholars as well 
as practitioners. 
3.2.1.1. United States 
The Dodd Frank Act divides regulatory authority for the deriv-
atives market between the CFTC and the SEC.  Under the provisions 
of the CFMA, the CFTC and the SEC could regulate the futures mar-
kets but were not allowed to regulate the swaps market.  Nonethe-
less, the CFMA gave the SEC authority to investigate cases of fraud 
on the swaps market,139 including credit default swaps.  Because the 
SEC could not impose transparency requirements such as record 
keeping or disclosure rules, it was difficult for the agency to exercise 
its anti-fraud authority.  
The Dodd Frank Act solved the issue of lack of sufficient power 
to regulate and monitor the OTC market by giving the CFTC and 
the SEC joint responsibility over swaps.140  The authority of the 
CFTC includes swaps, swap dealers and major swap participants, 
swap data repositories, and derivative clearing organizations 
(DCOs).141  The SEC has similar rulemaking powers but with respect 
to security-based swaps.142  
Both the CFTC and the SEC have to coordinate and consult with 
each other in formulating and implementing new rules in order to 
maintain consistency in regulations across their respective jurisdic-
tions.143  In addition, when making rules, the SEC and the CFTC 
must consult with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.144  The 
Dodd Frank Act also gave the CFTC and the SEC joint rulemaking 
authority to develop regulations establishing the requirements for 
the records that must be kept for swap data in repositories.145  
                                                     
139 7 U.S.C. § 2.  
140 Dodd Frank Act § 712 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302). 
141 Id. § 712(a)(1). 
142 Id. § 712(a)(2). 
143 Id. § 712(a)(1)–(2). 
144 Id. § 712(d)(1). 
145 Id. § 712(d)(2)(B). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
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3.2.1.2. European Union 
The EMIR grants regulatory authority to the ESMA in develop-
ing draft regulatory technical standards along with safeguarding the 
stability of the financial markets in an emergency situation.146  The 
ESMA also has a central role in the authorization and monitoring of 
CCPs and trade repositories.147  In addition, the EMIR authorizes the 
members of the European Central Banks (ESCB) to exercise over-
sight of the clearing and payment systems for derivatives.148  The 
ECSB is also responsible for approving interoperability arrange-
ments among the CCPs, authorization and monitoring of CCPs (in 
addition to the ESMA), and for recognizing CCPs in countries out-
side of the EU.149  The grant of authority to the ECSB system does 
not affect the existing responsibility of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) or the national central banks to ensure stable clearing and 
payment systems within the EU and within each member nation of 
the EU.150  The ESMA and the ESCB are required to cooperate closely 
when preparing the relevant draft technical standards.151 
3.2.1.3. US vs. EU  
The rulemaking powers granted to the regulatory authorities is 
one of the key differences between the US and the EU approaches.152  
The grant of regulatory authority under the Dodd Frank Act has the 
advantage of clearly defining and separating the responsibilities of 
the CFTC and SEC in the area of oversight of the OTC swaps market.  
At the same time, the advantage of the EU regulatory regime is that 
while it divides defined regulatory responsibilities between multi-
ple agencies, there is still one central regulator—the ESMA.  The US 
and the EU approaches fall within the three basic organizational 
                                                     
146 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 1(10). 
147 Id. 




152 See Daria S. Latysheva, Note, Taming the Hydra of Derivatives Regulation: Ex-
amining New Regulatory Approaches to OTC Derivatives in the United States and Europe, 
20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465, 490 (2012) (examining the differences between 
the US and EU models). 
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models that, according to professors Coffee and Sale,153 exist with 
regard to financial regulation in the major capital markets: the func-
tional/institutional model (current US approach), the consolidated 
financial services regulator model (current EU approach), and the 
'twin peaks' model. 
The US approach seems less optimal as it leaves a large room for 
different sets of rules governing similar instruments, which could 
create confusion or even fragmentation.154  Moreover, issues regard-
ing the fragmented regulatory scheme between these two agencies 
existed in the past with regulation of futures by the CFTC and reg-
ulation of securities by the SEC, and some commentators suggested 
“merging the CFTC and SEC and creating one regulatory body with 
jurisdiction over both.”155  Professor Jill E. Fisch also expressed her 
concern about having similar functions under the regulatory over-
sight of different agencies as it may produce jurisdictional conflicts 
or simply lead to regulatory gaps.156    
Another aspect where the Dodd Frank Act and EMIR differ re-
lates to establishing and implementing rules by the regulatory au-
thorities.  The Dodd Frank Act grants the regulators much broader 
authority to issue the necessary rules.  According to the EMIR, agen-
cies mainly just enforce, rather than issue, regulations—with the ex-
ception of regulatory technical standards in various aspects of regu-
lation, which ESMA should only draft, and the European 
Commission then adopts.  The EMIR itself contains detailed provi-
sions that directly regulate the functioning of CCPs and trade repos-
itories.  In contrast, the Dodd Frank Act authorizes the CFTC and 
the SEC to jointly adopt rules governing trade repositories.157  The 
US regulatory regime has always relied on the agencies' active role 
in establishing rules and standards.  The logic that lies behind it is 
that agency rulemaking ensures greater regulatory stability and 
clarity for regulated entities opposed to the case law.  Such reliance 
                                                     
153 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treas-
ury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 717 (2009) (analyzing the US and EU 
approaches based on three different frameworks). 
154 Scalcione, supra note 7, at 354. 
155 D'Souza et al., supra note 70, at 511–512. 
156 See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory  Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 
785, 786–87 (2009) (noting the potential issues the American system for regulating 
derivatives). 
157 Dodd Frank Act §712(d). 
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on agency rulemaking is not the case in the EU, where, besides cen-
tral regulators, each EU Member State also has its own regulatory 
authorities.  Already at the stage of drafting the current derivatives 
regulation, the European Commission explicitly stated that “the ob-
jectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Mem-
ber States and can . . . be better achieved by the EU.”158  Thus, the EU 
regulation leaves some, but much less space for adopting rules by 
the regulators, which seems to be better tailored to ensure a compre-
hensive regulatory framework.  
Another advantage of the EU regulatory approach is the greater 
responsibility of the banking system and the ECSB in regulating the 
operations of CCPs in comparison with the US approach.  The ECSB 
directly monitors the CCPs and functions as a regulatory agency 
with a banking agency that has more experience in supervising such 
process as clearing in the CCP.  In the US, the advisory position of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors reduces its ability to regu-
late the operations of CCPs.  While the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors in the US provides CCPs with liquidity and access to dis-
count windows,159 the central bank does not have the same oversight 
authority over CCP operations as in the EU.  As a result, the SEC 
and the CFTC have complete responsibility for monitoring clearing 
processes and capital adequacy—ensuring that the CCPs properly 
manage their capital reserves. 
The differences in the grant of regulatory authority in the US and 
the EU are likely to be the result of the regulatory structure devel-
opment in both jurisdictions.  The federal government in the US has 
exclusive jurisdiction over financial regulation that involves inter-
state transactions with various federal agencies having authority to 
oversee financial markets.  The Dodd Frank Act amended existing 
legislation to incorporate swaps by granting additional authority to 
agencies.  In addition, some rivalry is likely to exist among agencies 
that led to splitting jurisdiction between the SEC and the CFTC.  In 
contrast, the EU has concurrent jurisdiction in financial matters with 
Member States due to its structure, where the Member States have 
retained power to control matters such as regulation of markets 
                                                     
158 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM (pro-
posed 2010), at 6. 
159 Dodd Frank Act § 806 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465). 
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within their borders.  In addition, the regulatory agencies of the EU 
are not as well established as in the US and do not have an extensive 
history of oversight in specific areas.  The EMIR functionally estab-
lished new authority to regulate rather than to amend a broad array 
of existing statutes authorizing regulation of financial markets.  
3.2.2. Covered Instruments 
 The scope of the instruments covered is one of the core aspects 
regarding derivatives regulation.  The way derivatives are defined 
gives the basis for construing and applying all remaining rules and 
regulations.  Hence, it is very critical to understand to which instru-
ments the relevant rules apply as this may create further obligations 
for the parties, e.g., clearing or reporting, or both.  
3.2.2.1. United States 
The provisions of the Dodd Frank Act apply to all transactions 
in the OTC market that involve the purchase or sale of derivatives 
with exceptions for some types of transactions.  Title VII of the Dodd 
Frank Act applies to “swaps” and “security-based swaps” as they 
are defined in the CEA and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34 
Act) i.e.: 
“Swaps”160 include, inter alia: (1) options of any kind; (2) con-
tracts that provide for a purchase, sale or payment that is 
contingent on a financial, economic or commercial event 
(e.g., CDS); (3) executory exchange payment contracts based 
on the value or level of an underlying asset that transfers fi-
nancial risk associated with it (not a property interest); and 
(4) other contracts commonly known as swaps.  
 Exclusions: security-based swaps (other than “mixed 
swaps”) and the transactions qualifying for a specific 
exclusion.161 
                                                     
160 Commodity Exchange Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(a)(47), as amended by the Dodd 
Frank Act, § 721, and further defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC 
and the SEC (77 FR 48356, Aug. 13, 2012). 
161 Inter alia: (1) Listed futures; (2) options on securities and indices that are 
subject to US securities laws; (3) physically-settled security forwards subject to US 
securities laws (unless contingent on a third-party credit event); (4) debt securities 
subject to US securities laws; (5) certain physically-settled commodity forwards; 
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“Security-based swaps”162 include swaps based on (1) a sin-
gle security or loan; (2) a “narrow-based security index” 
(generally, 9 or less); (3) events relating to an issuer of secu-
rities or issuers of securities in a “narrow-based security in-
dex” (e.g., single-name CDS). 
 Exclusions: transactions excluded from “swap” defi-
nition and derivatives on US government or agency 
securities. 
As we can see, the division of the primary regulatory authority 
between the CFTC for swap transactions and the SEC for security-
based swap transactions is reflected in defining these instruments in 
separate provisions.  Security-based swaps are essentially limited to 
swaps based on single securities, single loans or narrow-based secu-
rities indices, and the CFTC regulates all other swaps.  Mixed swap 
transactions that have characteristics of both swaps and security-
based swaps, are subject to dual jurisdiction of the CFTC and the 
SEC. 
3.2.2.2. European Union 
Under the EMIR, “derivative” or “derivative contract,” includes 
options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and other deriva-
tive contracts in relation to a very broad range of underliers.163  
“OTC derivative,” or “OTC derivative contract,” means a derivative 
contract that is not executed on a regulated market or on a third-
country market considered as equivalent to a regulated market.164  
Despite a rather broad definition of derivatives, there are certain 
transactions not mentioned by the EMIR and MiFID (and MiFID II) 
and therefore do not fall within the scope of the new regulation, e.g., 
                                                     
(6) Foreign Exchange (FX) spots (if not “rolling spots”); (7) certain physically-settled 
FX forwards and swaps (certain requirements still apply); (8) transactions with the 
US government or a US agency backed by full faith and credit of the United States; 
(9) specified “Consumer” and “Commercial” Transactions (10) certain regulated in-
surance products. 
162 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(68), as amended by § 721 of the Dodd 
Frank Act, and further defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the 
SEC (77 FR 48356, Aug. 13, 2012). 
163 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 2(5) (by reference to points (4) to (10) of Section C 
of Annex I to MiFID).  The relevant sections of the MiFID II are pretty much the 
same. 
164 Id. art. 2(7). 
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inter alia: (1) spot transactions; (2) certain physically-settled com-
modity and exotic underliers transactions; (3) FX spots (if not "roll-
ing spots"). 
3.2.2.3. US vs. EU 
The US and European approaches to defining derivatives differ 
significantly, which inevitably leads to further distinctions in the 
overall derivatives market regulation.  
First of all, the EMIR, along with MIFID, introduces a new defi-
nition of derivatives, whereas the Dodd Frank Act does not define 
them at all but rather contains a very broad definition of swaps.  If 
the main purpose of the regulation was to introduce a harmonized 
framework for all derivatives, the question arises: Why did the US 
legislators choose not to work out a comprehensive definition of de-
rivatives?165  One possible explanation goes back to the issues dis-
cussed in section 3.2.1. of this Part, i.e., regulatory authorities.  Ob-
viously, division of all instruments covered by the Dodd Frank Act 
into swaps and security-based swaps justifies the existence of the 
two regulatory agencies as opposed to having one authority in case 
of a unified category of derivatives.  This does not mean that the 
American Government simply wants to have two agencies instead 
of one.  The logic seems to lie behind the idea of maintaining the 
powers of the SEC to regulate securities and of the CFTC to regulate 
commodities.  Another justification of this structure relates to the 
point that the legislators had the intent to regulate only the new in-
struments and leave the existing ones—i.e., futures—subject to ex-
isting regulation under the CEA.166  
  Another distinction, evident even through a very high-level 
comparative analysis, is that the EMIR definition of derivatives has 
a broader and less fragmented scope, including almost any kind of 
derivatives.  The Dodd Frank Act, in contrast, does not include any 
futures or physically-settled commodity forwards for the reason 
mentioned above—i.e., they are all regulated by the CEA.  Moreo-
ver, almost all CDSs fall within the definition of swaps under the 
Dodd Frank Act except only single-name CDSs as long as they are 
based on events relating to one or more reference securities.  Even 
                                                     
165 Scalcione, supra note 7, at 358. 
166 Id. at 359. 
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though the SEC and CFTC should consult with each other before 
issuing rules in order to make such rules consistent, such classifica-
tion of instruments creates diversity and therefore leaves oppor-
tunity for fragmentation and different treatment of incredibly simi-
lar instruments.  Certainly, it could be the case that the purpose of 
Congress was to leave the distinction between the instruments 
based on the nature of their underlier (commodity vs. security) ra-
ther than treating them all with regard to their common economic 
function.  However, this seems neither convincing nor efficient 
when considering possible significant differences in further regula-
tion.  
Thus, the practical difference in the US and EU approaches is 
that the former appears to be more fragmented and covers fewer 
number of instruments.  For instance, listed futures are regulated by 
the EMIR, but fall outside the definition of swap under the Dodd 
Frank Act as they are covered by the CEA.  The scope of the Dodd 
Frank is further fragmented by the division of instruments into 
swaps and security-based swaps depending on their underliers and 
by the division of the authority to oversee these instruments be-
tween two agencies—the CFTC and the SEC accordingly.  
Finally, from a standpoint of statute-drafting technique, the def-
inition of swaps under the Dodd Frank Act is more remote from the 
standard market and finance practices.  For instance, options have 
never been considered swaps in the finance world even though they 
are defined as swaps by the Dodd Frank Act.  Such confusion could 
have been escaped by simply listing options separately from 
swaps,167 but the legislators preferred, instead, to create a unified 
category of swaps. 
Despite the specified disadvantages of the US approach in defin-
ing the instruments included in the scope of the regulation, it shall 
be fairly noted that the European definition of derivatives, although 
broader in scope, is much less detailed and thorough in specifying 
the instruments covered.  The MIFID, as well as its future substitute 
MIFID II, simply lists the types of instruments that are considered 
derivatives–i.e., swaps, futures, options—without defining or enu-
merating the content of these instruments, as is done in very much 
detail in the Dodd Frank Act.  Moreover, the European statutes do 
not explicitly determine which instruments are not covered.  This 
                                                     
167 Id. at 358. 
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creates confusion for the market participants, who have to under-
stand which transactions fall under the regulation.  On the other 
hand, the relatively broad definition of the derivatives makes it eas-
ier for the regulators to include exotic derivatives that can be devel-
oped in the future. 
Nevertheless, overall, the European approach seems to be better 
tailored and more comprehensive—its unified category of both de-
rivatives and OTC derivatives leaves almost no room for divergent 
interpretations.  This means that the regulation is not locked in a 
narrow group of instruments and its detailed scope can be easily ad-
justed via technical standards according to the current market con-
ditions without the necessity of amending the regulation itself, for 
instance, in case of new exotic derivatives development. 
3.2.3. Covered Parties 
The scope of the parties covered is another sensitive regulatory 
area, which directly affects market participants and sets up certain 
constraints on them.  Different approaches as to covered parties may 
lead to different results in terms of the effectiveness of the overall 
regulation.  More importantly, regulation of market participants has 
a direct effect on determining the major actors of the derivatives 
market in the future. 
3.2.3.1. United States 
The Dodd Frank Act functionally covers all parties entering into 
a swap contract by imposing registration requirements as long as 
one party is a derivative dealer or holds substantial derivatives po-
sitions.  The legislation introduces definitions of “swap dealer” and 
of “major swap participant” in the CEA and similar definitions of 
“security-based swap dealer” and of “major security-based swap 
participant” in the 1934 Act.168  
Swap (security-based swap) dealer is defined as any person 
who: (1) holds himself or herself out as a dealer in swaps (security-
based swap); (2) makes a market in swaps (security-based swaps); 
                                                     
168 Dodd Frank Act, § 721(49)(A) and 761(71)(A) accordingly, and as further 
defined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the SEC: (1) CEA § 1a(49) 
of the Act and 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg) – swap dealer; (2) ’34 Act §3(a)(71) and 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.3a71–1 - security-based swap dealer. 
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(3) regularly enters into swaps (security-based swap) as counter-
party in the course of business for his or her own account; or (4) en-
gages in activity regularly considered in the trade as making a mar-
ket for swap (security-based swap).169  However, the term “swap 
(security-based swap) dealer” does not include a person that enters 
into swaps (security-based swaps) for such person's own account, 
either individually or in a fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of 
regular business.170 
Major swap (security-based swap) participant is a person that is 
not a swap (security-based swap) dealer and: (1) maintains a “sub-
stantial position” in a major swap category excluding hedging or 
mitigating for commercial risk or positions maintained by any em-
ployee benefit plan; or (2) has outstanding swaps that create sub-
stantial exposure that could have adverse effects on financial stabil-
ity of the US banking system or financial markets; or (3) any 
financial entity that is highly leveraged relative to the capital it holds 
and is not subject to a capital adequacy requirement and maintain a 
substantial position in a major swap (security-based swap) cate-
gory.171  
Finally, another category that has to be mentioned is that of “el-
igible contract participant,” a new category introduced by the Dodd 
Frank Act.172  The regulation makes it unlawful for a person that is 
not an eligible contract participant to enter into a swap (security-
based swap) unless that swap (security-based swap) is entered into 
over a board of trade that has been designated by the CFTC as a 
                                                     
169 Id. The latter criterion is subject to a de minimus exemption defined by the 
CFTC and the SEC for swap dealers and security-based swap dealers under the 
Dodd Frank Act § 721(49)(D) and 761(71)(D) accordingly.  Such exemption is deter-
mined in C.F.R. § 1.3(ggg)(3) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71–2 for swap dealer and secu-
rity-based swap dealers accordingly. 
170 See C.F.R. §1.3(ggg); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71–1 accordingly (defining 
swap dealer.) 
171 Dodd Frank Act §721(33)(A) and 761(67)(A) accordingly, and as further de-
fined as a result of joint rulemaking by the CFTC and the SEC: (1) CEA §1a(33) of 
the Act and C.F.R. § 1.3(hhh) – major swap participant; (2) ’34 Act § 3(a)(67) and 
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a67–1- major security-based swap participant.  The CFTC and the 
SEC have further adopted rules to determine such categories as “substantial posi-
tion”, “financial entity,” “high leverage,” “substantial counterparty exposure,” and 
“hedging or mitigating commercial risk;” see generally, C.F.R. § 1.3(hhh) and 17 
C.F.R. § 240.3a67 accordingly (defining major swap participant). 
172 Dodd Frank Act § 723 for swaps and § 763 for security based swaps (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) accordingly). 
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contract market.173  An eligible contract participant is defined as an 
entity or an individual that satisfies specific criteria enumerated in 
the statute,174 as further implemented by CFTC rules.175  
The Dodd Frank Act also contains more specific provisions reg-
ulating swap trading by banks: 
 “Push-Out Provision”176 stating that no Federal 
assistance177 will be provided to any swaps en-
tity178 with respect to any swap, security-based 
swap, or other activity of the swaps entity. 
                                                     
173 Id. 
174 CEA § 1(a)(18). 
175 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(m). Under this Rule, major swap (security-based swap) par-
ticipants and swap (security-based swap) dealers are also considered within the 
category of an eligible contract participant.  
176 Dodd Frank Act § 716 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305), as amended by Consol-
idated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113—235 
(2014). 
177 “Federal assistance” is defined as the use of any advances from any Federal 
Reserve credit facility or discount window that is not part of a program or facility 
with broad-based eligibility under section 343(3)(A) of Title 12, Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation insurance or guarantees for the purpose of: (A) making any 
loan to, or purchasing any stock, equity interest, or debt obligation of, any swaps 
entity; (B) purchasing the assets of any swaps entity; (C) guaranteeing any loan or 
debt issuance of any swaps entity; or (D) entering into any assistance arrangement 
(including tax breaks), loss sharing, or profit sharing with any swaps entity. 
178 “Swaps entity” is defined as any swap (security-based swap) dealer or ma-
jor swap (security-based swap) participant, except major swap (security-based 
swap) participant that is a covered depository institution, provided that it limits its 
swap and security-based swap activities to the following: (1) hedging and other 
similar risk mitigation activities; (2) non-structured finance swap activities; (3) cer-
tain structured finance swap activities (undertaken for hedging or risk management 
purposes or if each asset-backed security underlying such structured finance swaps 
is of a credit quality and of a type or category with respect to which the prudential 
regulators have jointly adopted rules authorizing swap or security-based swap ac-
tivity by covered depository institutions). The term “covered depository institu-
tion” means (1) an insured depository institution, as that term is defined in section 
3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813); and (2) a United States 
uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank.  However, certain restrictions on 
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 “Volcker Rule”179 prohibiting a banking entity 
from (1) engaging in proprietary trading;180 or (2) 
acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or 
other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge 
fund or a private equity. 
Thus, the Dodd Frank Act amended prior legislation to ensure 
that individuals engaged in the business of buying and selling 
swaps on behalf of themselves or others would now be regulated. 
3.2.3.2. European Union 
The EMIR does not make the same distinction of covered per-
sons as the Dodd Frank Act does in terms of swap dealers and major 
market participants.  Instead, the EMIR focuses on defining cover-
age in terms of the nature of the parties involved in the transaction 
or, more specifically, their business purposes rather than on trans-
action type.  
Under the provisions of the EMIR, covered participants are clas-
sified as financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties.  
The financial counterparty is defined as an organization in the finan-
cial industry as authorized by various EC Directives and generally 
includes investment firms, banks and other credit institutions, in-
surance and reinsurance companies, and certain asset management 
companies.181  A non-financial counterparty is an undertaking estab-
lished in the EU that does not fit the definition of a financial coun-
terparty or of a CCP.182  
                                                     
179 Dodd Frank Act § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). 
180  “Proprietary trading” is defined as engaging as a principal for the trading 
account of a banking organization or supervised nonbank financial company in any 
transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of any: (1) security; 
(2) derivative; (3) contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery; (4) option on 
any such security, derivative, or contract; or (5) any other security or financial in-
strument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the SEC and the CFTC may 
determine. However, the Volcker Rule does specifically permit certain trading 
transactions, inter alia: (1) in government securities; (2) in connection with under-
writing or market-making, to the extent that either does not exceed near term de-
mands of clients, customers, or counterparties; (3) on behalf of customers; or (4) by 
an insurance business for the general account of the insurance company; (5) certain 
risk-mitigating hedging. 
181 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 2(8). 
182 Id. art 2(9).  
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While ESMA has not issued definitive rules concerning covered 
party determinations, the rules that will be established are likely to 
be relatively broad and therefore consistent with the general regula-
tory trend of covering as many parties as possible while providing 
exemptions based on transaction type.  As a result, the majority of 
entities engaged in OTC transactions in the EU are likely to be con-
sidered covered parties. 
3.2.3.3. US vs. EU 
The Dodd Frank approach to covered parties creates categories 
of market participants and establishes threshold criteria for the par-
ties to be covered by the statute.  Once a party meets the coverage 
criteria, all of the provisions of the statute and rules of the various 
regulatory agencies apply.  In contrast, the EMIR approach estab-
lishes two categories of market participants covered by the regula-
tion.  While a particular transaction may be excluded from coverage, 
the parties are generally covered.  
On the one hand, the US approach seems very flexible as only 
parties involved in qualifying transactions are subject to regulation, 
whereas all others fall outside the regulation.183  However, such a 
regulatory scheme creates fragmentation as parties who use swaps 
only infrequently remain unregulated.184  In other words, the US re-
gime looks to be oriented only towards professional swap traders.  
Again, since the Dodd Frank Act was a response to the financial cri-
sis, it could be the case that the intent of the legislators was to regu-
late only major derivatives players in order to enable regulators to 
monitor and avoid a repeat of the large financial exposures and fail-
ures that took place in 2008.  The European framework has a broader 
scope of parties covered and, again, seems to be much more com-
prehensive as it allows to simply treat market participants differ-
ently within the regulation as opposed to leaving some of them com-
pletely unregulated.  
Moreover, as fairly noticed by commentators,185 the US “prod-
uct-by-product” regulation could hardly be manageable, both for 
the participants to comply with it as well as for the regulators to 
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monitor participants.  The European approach of regulating all en-
tities’ trading derivatives, rather than adopting a “product-by-prod-
uct” approach, is much more efficient as it captures major partici-
pants as well as less significant derivatives trading.  That said, the 
comprehensive approach is a much more intrusive form of regula-
tion. 
The Dodd Frank Act is also distinct from the EMIR as it contains 
specific “healthy” provisions regulating swap trading by banks.  
The effect of the Volcker Rule is considered to be the transition of 
swap trading from banks that are “too big to fail” to less systemically 
risky parts of the market.186  The Push-Out Rule was also initially 
intended to move risky swap trades into a more diverse framework, 
within which speculation would be less impactful on the prices of 
underliers.187  
There were, as is always the case with new regulation, certain 
concerns with regard to the Push-Out Rule.  For instance, US dealers 
might consider moving their business to broker-dealer subsidiaries 
in other jurisdictions, which could make it difficult and complex to 
close positions and therefore potentially increase systemic risk.188  
Another argument against the Push-Out Rule is that it is unneces-
sary, as market risks posed by “pushed-out” derivatives can be ne-
gated through offsetting positions.  The Volcker Rule is criticized as 
leaving a loophole for “embedded proprietary trading,” when a 
bank betting on the direction of a market “may just avoid hedging 
the opposite side of a client order,”189 and that is perfectly permissi-
ble under the Rule.  These concerns are fair, but not perfect, as, for 
instance, it is not always the case that an offsetting position exists.190  
                                                     
186 Greenberger, Overwhelming, supra note 76, at 163. 
187 Id. 
188 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, SWAPS PUSH-OUT TO HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON 
U.S. DEALERS 2 (June 21, 2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_ stor-
age/www.complianceweek.com/ContentPages/139709745.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JUN2-YMV7]. 
189 Matthew Leising, Dropping Swaps Plan for Volcker Rule May Not Reduce Bank 
Risk, BLOOMBERG, June 11, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/            arti-
cles/2010-06-11/dropping-swaps-plan-for-volcker-rule-may-still-allow-banks-to-
take-risks [perma.cc/C83E-2X3L].  
190 Adam J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The 
Costs, Risks and Politics, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 269, 286 (2011). 
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Nevertheless, under the pressure of criticism, the Push-Out Rule 
has been recently amended by: (1) extending the coverage of its ex-
emption to uninsured US branches or agencies of foreign banks;191 
and (2) significantly narrowing the scope of instruments subject to 
the push-out requirement by the exempted parties by limiting it to 
swaps (security-based swaps) based on asset-backed securities.  Ob-
viously, such an amendment is the result of the lobbying efforts of 
big banks, as large institutions always want to be free to speculate 
on such opaque financial instruments as derivatives and, at the same 
time, to have the “Too Big to Fail” guarantee from the government.  
Despite being controversial to a certain extent and making trading 
rather complex, the overall positive effect of the original Push-Out 
provision seemed much more meaningful than its potential costs.  
Now, even though the Push-Out Rule nominally still exists, and the 
Volcker Rule still imposes limitations on big banks, the amendment 
of the Push Out requirement is a negative precedent in the context 
of the repeal of financial regulation.  
The advantage of the Dodd Frank over the EMIR approach, on 
the one hand, could be that the regulatory agencies may amend the 
rules and determine whether a person's OTC trading activity meets 
the threshold for coverage.  However, the categories of swap dealers 
and major swap participants seem to be excessively complicated in 
comparison with the EMIR approach.  For instance, the CFTC rules 
for assessing whether a person is a swap dealer or a major market 
participant focus on the total value of transactions, whereas the vol-
ume of transactions can vary so that a person could be a covered 
party at one time and not a covered party at another time.  In con-
trast, the EMIR approach appears to be rather simple covering all 
financial and non-financial entities with exclusions based on the na-
ture of the transactions.  Nevertheless, none of the approaches seems 
to be perfect, and some sort of their combination would be much 
more appropriate and efficient.192 
The scope of the parties covered differs like all previously dis-
cussed areas of the US and EU regulations.  However, in this case, it 
is much harder to give preference to either approach as both have 
their own benefits and disadvantages.  Overall, the EU regime seems 
                                                     
191 Previously, only insured depository institutions were exempted. 
192 To be discussed in more detail further. 
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more comprehensive, meaning broader in its scope, whereas the US 
scheme is much more detailed, i.e., focused on specific issues.  
3.2.4. Clearing, Trading and Reporting Requirements 
Clearing requirements have always been the central issue 
among scholars and has become the “heart” of derivatives regula-
tion both in the US and Europe.  Clearinghouses or CCPs connect 
buyers and sellers of derivatives contracts by receiving and distrib-
uting payments associated with derivatives contracts.  A properly 
functioning CCP helps the parties in a financial contract manage 
counterparty risk and improves transparency by providing contin-
uous mark-to-market information about the value of the derivatives 
and their collateral.  The establishment of special trading platforms 
is a higher level of regulation, as the derivatives have to go through 
a clearing process before entering trading execution facilities.  Inter-
estingly enough, the statistical data shows that approximately over 
70% of interest rate derivatives and CDSs are cleared through clear-
ing houses, whereas more than 60% of those instruments are traded 
on swap execution facilities.193  Thus, the proper clearing and trad-
ing requirements are crucial for the overall derivative’s regulatory 
framework.  Finally, reporting requirements help the regulators 
keep track of the derivatives transactions and provide information 
about them to the public. 
3.2.4.1. United States 
3.2.4.1.1. Clearing 
The Dodd Frank Act prohibits swap (security-based swap) 
trades that have not been cleared to a DCO registered with the CFTC 
or to a clearing agency with the SEC, or exempt from registration if 
                                                     
193 According to ISDA SwapsInfo comparative analysis (2015 year-to-date vs. 
2014 year-to-date) for the week ending March 27, 2015, 72% of interest rate deriva-
tives total notional was cleared versus 77%, whereas statistics for CDSs are 81% and 
62% respectively.  However, only 62% of interest rate derivatives total notional was 
executed on SEFs versus 52%, and 71% of CDSs total notional was executed on SEFs 
vs. 45%.  See ISDA, IRD and CDS Weekly Analysis: week ending March 27, 2015, 
http://www.swapsinfo.org/market-analysis/ [perma.cc/2D6S-VRHY] (describ-
ing fluctuation in notionals and trade counts for the week.) 
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the swap (security-based swap) is required to be cleared.194  Swaps 
(security based swaps) become subject to mandatory clearing upon 
issuance of a mandatory clearing determination by the CFTC or the 
SEC.195  Moreover, DCOs (clearing agencies) have to submit all 
swaps (security-based swaps) that they plan to accept for clearing to 
the CFTC or the SEC for review and final determination on clear-
ing.196  Thus, the final decision on clearing rests always with the 
CFTC or the SEC.  
Nonetheless, transactions that would otherwise be subject to 
mandatory clearing may fall into one of several exceptions to the 
clearing requirement.  First, there is a so-called “end-user” exemp-
tion, according to which the clearing requirements do not apply if 
any of the counterparties to the swap (security-based swap): (1) are 
not a financial entity;197 (2) use the swap (security-based swap) to 
hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (3) make a showing to the 
CFTC or SEC, accordingly, that it generally meets its financial obli-
gations related to such non-cleared swap (security-based swap).198  
Certain exemptions may also apply to affiliates of such “end-us-
ers”.199  Second, the CFTC or the SEC may consider exempting small 
                                                     
194 Dodd Frank Act § 723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly).  However, the regulators 
should consider the following factors when deciding on clearing requirement: (i) 
liquidity, volume, and availability of pricing data; (ii) operational ability to clear 
the contract; (iii) effect on systemic risk; (iv) effect on competition; and (v) legal 
certainty of the contract in the event of insolvency of the derivatives clearing organ-
ization standing behind the contract. 
195 Id.  The CFTC issued rules determining the first group of clearable swaps 
that mostly consists of interest rate and some credit swaps.  See Clearing Requirement 
Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,284 (Dec. 13, 2012). 
196 Id. 
197 The term “financial entity” includes: (1) a swap dealer; (2) a security-based 
swap dealer; (3) a major swap participant; (4) a major security-based swap partici-
pant; (5) a commodity pool; (6) a private fund; (7) an employee benefit plan; (8) a 
person predominantly engaged in banking or financial activities.  17 § C.F.R. 23.505 
(2013).  
198 Dodd Frank Act §723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly).  However, the “end-
user” may still decide to clear the transaction.  7 U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 
(2010).  
199 An affiliate of a person that qualifies for an “end-user” exception (including 
affiliate entities predominantly engaged in providing financing for the purchase of 
the merchandise or manufactured goods of the person) may qualify for the excep-
tion only if the affiliate, acting on behalf of the person and as an agent, uses the 
swap (security-based swap) to hedge or mitigate the commercial risk of the person 
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banks, savings associations, farm credit system institutions, and 
credit unions depending on their total assets threshold.200  Also, 
swaps (security-based swaps) entered into prior to the effective date 
or application of a clearing requirement need not be cleared if they 
are appropriately reported.201  Finally, the CFTC and the SEC cannot 
adopt rules requiring a DCO (clearing agency) to list for clearing a 
swap (security-based swap) if that would threaten the financial in-
tegrity of the DCO (clearing agency).202  Dodd Frank, however, with 
regard to all uncleared swaps (security-based swaps), mandates203 
the imposition of regulatory margin requirements204 on swap (secu-
rity-based swap) dealers and major swap (security-based swap) par-
ticipants as well as requirements to segregate205 initial margin on re-
quest of the counterparty. 
3.2.4.1.2. Trade Execution 
The Dodd Frank Act requires that all swaps (security-based 
swaps) that are subject to mandatory clearing be traded on a desig-
nated contract market (exchange) or through a swap (security-based 
swap) execution facility (either registered or exempt from registra-
tion).206  However, such trade execution requirements do not apply 
if no designated contract market (exchange) or swap (security-based 
swap) execution facility makes the swap (security-based swap) 
                                                     
or other affiliate of the person that is not a financial entity.  However, such affiliate 
is not exempt if it is: (1) a swap dealer; (2) a security-based swap dealer; (3) a major 
swap participant; (4) a major security-based swap participant; (5) an issuer that 
would be an investment company; (6) a commodity pool; or (7) a bank holding 
company with over $50,000,000,000 in consolidated assets. 17 § C.F.R. 23.505 (2013). 
200 Dodd Frank Act §723(a)(3) for swaps and 763(a) for security-based swaps 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3 accordingly).  7 U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15 
U.S.C. § 78c–3 (2010). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Margin requirements are set up by the CFTC or the SEC, accordingly, or 
prudential bank regulators if swap (security-based swap) dealers and major swap 
(security-based swap) participants are banks. 
204 Dodd Frank Act §731 for swaps and 763 for security-based swaps (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. § 6s and 15 U.S.C. § 78o–10 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 6s (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 
78o–10 (2010).  
205 Dodd Frank Act §724 for swaps and 763 for security-based swaps (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. § 6s and 15 U.S.C. § 78c–5 accordingly). 7 U.S.C. § 6s (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 
78c–5 (2010).  
206 Id. 
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available to trade or for transactions subject to the clearing excep-
tions.207 
3.2.4.1.3. Reporting 
The Dodd Frank Act requires several types of reporting of swap 
(security-based swap) transactions.  First, every cleared swap (secu-
rity-based swap), whether required to be cleared or not, is subject to 
“real-time public reporting.”208  However, trades entered into prior 
to the effective date or application of a clearing requirement have to 
be reported in a manner that does not disclose the business transac-
tions or market positions of any persons.209  Second, each swap (se-
curity-based swap), whether cleared or not, must also be reported to 
a registered security-based swap data repository.210  Swaps (secu-
rity-based swaps) not accepted for clearing by any DCO (clearing 
agency) are reported to a swap data repository or, in the case in 
which there is no swap data repository that would accept them, to 
the CFTC or the SEC, accordingly.211  
3.2.4.2. European Union 
3.2.4.2.1. Clearing 
The EMIR may require OTC derivatives to be cleared, depend-
ing on the following two factors: (1) their type (class); and (2) coun-
terparties.  The EMIR establishes two possible ways to determine 
OTC derivatives classes that are subject to a clearing requirement.212  
First, when a competent Member State authority authorizes a CCP 
to clear a class of OTC derivatives, the ESMA has to be immediately 
                                                     
207 Id. 
208 Dodd Frank Act §727 for swaps and 763(i) for security-based swaps (codi-
fied at 7 U.S.C. § 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 78m accordingly). The term “real-time public 
reporting” is defined as to report data relating to a swap (security-based swap) 
transaction, including price and volume, as soon as technologically practicable after 
the time at which the swap (security-based swap) transaction has been executed.  7 
U.S.C. § 2 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2010). 
209 Id. 
210 Id.  
211 Dodd Frank Act §729 for swaps and 766 for security-based swaps (codified 
at 7 U.S.C. § 6r and 15 U.S.C. § 78m–1 accordingly).  7 U.S.C. § 6r (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 
78m-l (2010). 
212 EMIR, supra note 136, art. 5. 
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notified.213  After receiving such notification, the ESMA develops 
and submits to the European Commission draft regulatory technical 
standards specifying the class of OTC derivatives that should be 
cleared.214  Second, the ESMA can, on its own initiative, identify and 
notify the European Commission the classes of derivatives that 
should be subject to the clearing obligation, but for which no CCP 
has yet received authorization.215  
However, only the OTC derivative contracts concluded between 
the following counterparties have to be cleared:216 (1) two financial 
counterparties; (2) a financial counterparty and a non-financial 
above the clearing threshold;217 (3) two non-financial counterparties 
above the clearing threshold; (4) a financial counterparty or a non-
financial counterparty above the clearing threshold and an entity es-
tablished in a third country that would be subject to the clearing ob-
ligation if it were established in the EU; or (5) two entities estab-
lished in one or more third-countries that would be subject to the 
clearing obligation if they were established in the EU.218  
There are several exceptions to this rule.  First, the Regulation 
exempts from clearing historical trades under certain conditions.219  
                                                     
213 Id. art. 5(1). 
214 Id. art 5(2). Additionally, the ESMA has also to specify: (1) the date or dates 
from which the clearing obligation takes effect; and (2) the minimum remaining 
maturity in order to be subject to clearing for the OTC derivative contracts entered 
(novated) on or after notification of a CCP to ESMA but before the date from which 
the clearing obligation takes effect. 
215 Id. art. 5(3).  The ESMA takes into account several criteria, such as the degree 
of standardization, volume, liquidity and the availability of reliable pricing while 
determining classes of OTC derivatives to be cleared (Article 5(4)).  The ESMA has 
also to establish, maintain and keep up to date a public register in order to identify 
the classes of OTC derivatives subject to the clearing obligation (Article 6(1)). 
216 Id. art 4(1). 
217 According to EMIR, supra note 136, art. 10(1)(b), a non-financial counter-
party becomes subject to the clearing for future contracts if the rolling average po-
sition over 30 days exceeds the threshold set up by the ESMA for certain classes of 
OTC derivatives.   
218 Provided that the contract has a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect 
within the Union or where such an obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent 
the evasion of any provisions of the EMIR.  Id. 
219 Id. art. 4(1).  Exemption covers the contracts entered (or novated) on or after: 
(1) the date from which the clearing obligation takes effect; or (2) notification of a 
CCP to the ESMA but before the date from which the clearing obligation takes effect 
if the contracts do not have a minimum remaining maturity determined by the 
ESMA.  Id. art. 4(1).  
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Second, the EMIR provides a clearing exception for intra-group 
transactions that meet specified conditions.220  Finally, there is a 
time-limited221 exception that exempts from clearing OTC derivative 
contracts that are objectively measurable as reducing investment 
risks directly relating to the financial solvency of pension scheme 
arrangements.222  There is no explicit end-user exemption, but trans-
actions involving non-financial counterparties below the clearing 
threshold will not be subject to the clearing obligation.  
However, for uncleared OTC derivatives, the EMIR sets forth 
certain requirements.  First, financial counterparties and nonfinan-
cial counterparties have to ensure arrangements to measure, moni-
tor, and mitigate operational and credit risk.223  Additionally, finan-
cial counterparties and non-financial counterparties above the 
clearing threshold are required to have procedures for the timely, 
accurate, and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral with 
respect to OTC derivative contracts and daily “mark-to-market” ac-
counting.224 
3.2.4.2.2. Trade Execution 
The EMIR itself does not impose mandatory trading require-
ments.  These requirements are contained in the MiFID II / MiFIR.  
In general, the MiFIR requires the ESMA to determine the classes of 
derivatives that are subject to mandatory venue execution.225  Addi-
tionally, when the mandatory venue execution obligation is to take 
effect, derivatives must be subject to the clearing obligation under 
the EMIR, admitted to trading or traded on at least one trading 
                                                     
220 Id. art. 4(2).  Exemption is for cases, where the counterparties have notified 
their regulators that they intend to use the exemption (or, where the transaction is 
between an EU and non-EU entity, where the EU entity has obtained authorization 
from its regulator to use the exemption). 
221 For three years after the entry into force of the EMIR, i.e. by Aug. 16, 2015. 
Id. art. 89(1).  
222 Id. 
223 Id. art. 11(1). 
224 Id. art. 11(2); 11(3).  Where market conditions do not allow marketing to 
market, they shall mark to model.  Financial counterparties are also required to hold 
appropriate capital to cover risks not covered by collateral Id. art. 11(4).  
225 MiFIR supra note 138, art. 32(1). 
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venue (i.e., regulated market, MTF226, OTF227 or a third country trad-
ing venue228), and be sufficiently liquid to trade only on these ven-
ues.229  
3.2.4.2.3. Reporting 
Under the EMIR, counterparties and CCPs have to ensure that 
the details of any derivative contract they have concluded (and any 
modification or termination of that contract) are reported to a regis-
tered trade repository (or where no relevant trade repository avail-
able, to the ESMA).230  Trade repositories have to then publish ag-
gregate positions, arranged by class of derivatives, on the contracts 
reported to it.231 
3.2.4.3. US vs. EU 
3.2.4.3.1. Clearing 
In general, the US and EU similarly approach the imposition of 
clearing requirements on a broadly defined class of OTC derivatives 
and leave to relevant regulators the final decision on the application 
of the clearing obligation application to a particular class of OTC de-
rivatives.  This approach seems rather prudent as it may take time 
to completely analyze the OTC market and understand how to 
structure the clearing requirements regarding certain classes of de-
rivatives in the most appropriate way. 
By adopting legislation mandating the use of CCPs in the OTC 
derivatives market, the Congress and the European Commission al-
legedly aimed to use central clearing as a tool for reducing systemic 
                                                     
226 Multilateral Trading Facility. 
227 Organized Trading Facility. 
228 MiFIR, supra note 138, art. 28(1).  Provided that the European Commission 
deemed such third country trading venues to be subject to equivalent regulatory 
requirements to EU trading venues and provided that the third country provides 
for an effective equivalent system for the recognition of trading venues authorized 
under MiFID II to admit to trading or trade derivatives declared subject to a trading 
obligation in that third country on a non-exclusive basis. 
229 Id. art. 32(2). 
230 Eur. Parl. Regulation 648/2012, art. 9(1), 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (EU).  
231 Id. art. 81(1). 
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risk.232  However, there is a concern that systemic risk, on the con-
trary, could increase because of the imposition of a central clearing 
requirement, which establishes such “systematically important” or-
ganizations as CCPs and “eliminates opportunities for bilateral net-
ting.”233  Thus, a major concern is connected with the possibility of 
creating one or several “Too Big To Fail” entities234 instead of having 
numerous, or at least, many more entities as it previously was.  In 
other words, commentators do not like CCPs being “multiplied ver-
sions” of companies like AIG.  Such concerns are fair enough from 
the standpoint of systemic risk concentration, as the consequences 
of a CCP failure would be immense.  Nevertheless, there are several 
reasons why having central counterparties is critically important for 
reducing systemic risk.  First, the regulators can detect any problems 
of a CCP much more easily and quickly than of an independent par-
ticipant like AIG.  Moreover, it would be even better in this regard 
if only one dominant CCP emerges rather than several of them,235 so 
that the regulators have to monitor only one CCP.  Besides, CCPs’ 
operations are much less complex than those of financial institutions 
such as banks, as a CCP focuses on a single type of business.236  Fur-
thermore, CCPs are obliged to use such risk-reducing tools such as 
margin and collateral requirements.  Finally, the operation of clear-
ing houses that themselves are less opaque than banks increases the 
overall transparency of the derivatives market as CCPs serve as im-
portant information sources. 
There is also an issue related to the capability of certain instru-
ments to be cleared.  For effective implementation of central clear-
ing, two conditions are required:  standard terms and high trading 
volume.237  These conditions are necessary for successful CCP risk 
                                                     
232 Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and OTC Derivatives: The Impact of 
Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives Market, 44 Int'l Law. 1077, 
1106 (2010). 
233 Id. 
234 Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument 
for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. 
Pol’y 209, 259 (2014).  
235 David A. Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD 
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 72 (2010).  
236 Id. 
237 Richard Heffner, The Regulation of Multilateral Clearing in the United Kingdom 
and United States, Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Dick Frase & Helen 
Parry eds., 99  (2002). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/3
 
2016] FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES 1007 
 
 
management,238 i.e.: (1) standard terms for a valuation model of the 
derivative239 and (2) high trading volume for making clearing costs 
effective for a CCP.240  Thus, the decrease of standardization and in-
crease of complexity make modeling of the derivatives harder and 
much more expensive for the CCP,241 whereas without such model-
ing it will be impossible to appropriately measure and manage risks 
through just margin requirements imposed on clearing members.242  
Furthermore, the absence of high trading volume, i.e. low liquidity, 
could make the CCP unable to plan for the liquidation of a default-
ing position in the derivative, which may eventually lead to signifi-
cant losses for the CCP.243  Therefore, clearing is not the optimal so-
lution for all derivatives and regulators have to take this into 
consideration when determining the classes of derivatives that will 
be subject to the central clearing requirement.  The EMIR and the 
Dodd Frank Act, with regard to this issue, are fairly accurate and 
prudent in their language requiring the regulators to consider the 
level of standardization, trade volume, and other factors when de-
fining derivatives to be cleared.  
However, it shall be noted that imposing a clearing requirement 
only on standard and frequently traded derivatives will not com-
pletely solve the problem and may even create certain new issues.  
First, this will leave outside the clearing houses instruments that 
caused major concern in 2008, such as CDSs, as they are generally 
very customized contracts.  Moreover, by clearing only certain clas-
ses of derivatives, the OTC derivatives trades of the market partici-
pants will be divided into bilateral and centrally cleared portfolios, 
which, on the one hand, will provide additional opportunities for 
multilateral netting of the cleared instruments, but on the other, re-
duce the opportunities for bilateral netting that existed initially 
                                                     
238 Bank for International Settlements, New Developments in Settlement and 
Clearing Arrangements for OTC Derivatives 27 (Mar. 2007), available at http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7XT-BAT5] (hereinafter New 
Developments). 
239 Id. 
240 Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Theo Lubke, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report 
No. 424 Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure 8 (2010). 
241 Id. 
242 New Developments, supra note 239. 
243 Id.; Duffie et al., supra note 241. 
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when the whole OTC market was not subject to clearing.244  There-
fore, it would be beneficial if the regulators direct their efforts to en-
couraging derivatives standardization and clearing, since in order 
“[t]o fully achieve the benefits of central clearing, a critical mass of 
OTC derivatives products must move to [the] CCPs”.245  Otherwise, 
central clearing may actually increase net counterparty exposure 
and lead to financial instability.246  However, it seems impossible 
and non-practical to standardize all OTC derivatives, because, as 
mentioned above, their attractiveness to the market participants in-
heres in their ability to be tailored to the specific needs of the parties 
as much as necessary.  A partial solution for the underlined issues 
has been already offered by the legislators in both regimes–namely, 
the imposition of reporting and margin requirements on the un-
cleared derivatives.  This will, at least, reduce the counterparty risk 
and make the market more transparent.  
Another sensitive area regarding the clearing requirement re-
lates to the “end-user” exemption.  Both the EMIR and the Dodd-
Frank Act provide certain exceptions for transactions aimed at hedg-
ing commercial risks.  However, the US regulation contains a rather 
narrow definition of an “end-user”, whereas the EMIR simply ex-
cludes non-financial counterparties below the clearing threshold.  
Thus, both regimes explicitly do not exclude any financial entities 
from the clearing requirement.  In the US, commentators expressed 
their concern about the fact that the end-user exception would not 
cover certain market participants not qualifying as end-users, (such 
as small banks) but who, at the same time, are not systematically 
significant and cannot afford to meet clearing requirements.247  An-
other concern relates to the margin and collateral requirements for 
                                                     
244 McBride, supra note 233. 
245 Fin. Stability Bd, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.fsb.org/2010/10/fsb-report-on-implementing-otc-derivatives-
market-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/YZ82-VPSP ]. 
246 Darrell Duffie, Policy Issues Facing the Market for Credit Derivatives, in THE 
ROAD AHEAD FOR THE FED 107, 111-12 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009) 
247 Letter from Nat'l Rural Util. Cooperative Fin. Corp., to David A. Stawick, 
Secretary of the Comm'n, CFTC (Jan. 12, 2011). 
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all uncleared derivatives, including end-users, as these require-
ments create additional costs for end-users that may be transferred 
to the consumer.248  
One possible solution could be broadening the definition of 
“end-users” and requiring greater disclosure from these end-users, 
instead of imposing margin requirements on them.249  However, 
such a solution would still be incomplete.  From the standpoint of 
regulating derivatives to lessen the level of systemic risk, both mar-
gin requirements and extensive disclosure are critically important 
and are not interchangeable, especially for counterparties that deal 
with each other bilaterally rather than through CCPs.  What the reg-
ulators in both the US and EU could do is broaden the definition of 
“end-user” to include additional participants that meet a clearing 
threshold, i.e., something similar to what the EMIR does for the non-
financial counterparties.  But such a threshold has to be set only after 
accurate analysis of the market—anything else could produce a sit-
uation where many real “hedgers” will not fall under the exception 
due to the high volume of their derivatives trading.  This is some-
times the case with the de minimis threshold set by the SEC and the 
CFTC, a problem that the regulators acknowledge. 
Finally, it is very important to have an explicit end-user exemp-
tion as opposed to having an implied exception as in the European 
regulation, which excludes only non-financial counterparties below 
a clearing threshold.  However, another issue that may arise is that 
of distinguishing hedging from speculating and trading, as in the 
real world the line between these practices could be very thin.  It is 
very hard to find a “one size fits all” solution, as it seems that 
whether a party is hedging or not has to be determined on a case-
by-case basis.  Nevertheless, the regulators and, possibly, the courts 
can develop evidentiary factors that suggest hedging has taken 
place.  Preliminarily, such factors could be the existence of commer-
cial risk for the company without using derivatives, the dependence 
on the hedged underlier, and the intention of the company’s repre-
sentatives involved in entering derivatives.  Since the decision to en-
gage in hedging is not made in a day, the company should have a 
                                                     
248 Katharine Rose, Annuity Issuers Eye Dodd–Frank Act, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER/ LIFE & HEALTH FIN. SERV., Vol. 114 Issue 16, 12 (Aug. 23, 2010) 
249 Carney Simpson, Do End-Users Get the Best of Both Worlds? – Title VII of Dodd 
Frank and the End-User Exception, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1759, 1787 (2012). 
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hedging decision-making process reflected in many of its docu-
ments to be able to provide sufficient evidence and convince the reg-
ulators or the court that the real purpose of using derivatives was 
actually hedging.    
3.2.4.3.2. Trade Execution 
Requirements of trade execution in the US and the EU share core 
aspects.  Trading on special platforms is required depending on 
whether there is a clearing obligation or not.  Provided that the reg-
ulators will make only highly standardized derivatives subject to 
such obligation, trade requirements perfectly fit the overall intention 
of the derivatives regulation.  Moreover, the existence of trading 
platforms additionally reduces transaction costs, as counterparties 
do not have to pay large fees to banks (which they would if they 
were negotiating the derivatives privately).250  
It is also interesting to note the relationship between the men-
tioned platforms and exchanges.  It may seem that the drafters of the 
legislation in the US (and EU as well) assumed most derivatives 
would be traded on exchanges.  However, the special trading plat-
forms have become the norm.  The reasons for this could be the fol-
lowing.  First, the legislators did not want to make the transfer of 
OTC derivatives from the “dark side” to transparency in too much 
of a coercive fashion, i.e., they established special platforms to make 
it smoother.  Second, in my opinion the regulators still assume com-
plete derivatives standardization in the future and, thus, consider 
such platforms as an interim stage before all derivatives move to ex-
changes.  However, as explained further, it seems unlikely for indi-
vidually tailored derivatives to disappear. 
3.2.4.3.3. Reporting 
In general, reporting requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the EMIR are rather similar.  However, there is a minor differ-
ence that relates to the variations in treatment and obligations to-
wards trade repositories.  While the Dodd-Frank Act mandates re-
porting only for bilaterally cleared transactions (as the rest of the 
information is compiled and reported by CCPs), the EMIR requires 
                                                     
250 Skeel, supra note 236, at 69. 
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reporting by market participants of all open OTC derivative con-
tracts.  Nevertheless, both regulations are aimed at price transpar-
ency and thus have a great positive effect—namely, they eliminate 
the information asymmetry that existed in the past and therefore re-
duce information costs to market participants, in particular the end-
users.  Lastly, the reporting requirement serves as a great alternative 
means of making the uncleared transactions more transparent.   
3.2.5. Extraterritorial Application 
Because of the global nature of the derivatives market, regula-
tions have some degree of extraterritorial reach to ensure that mar-
ket actors do not use jurisdictional limitations to circumvent the in-
tent of the regulations. 
3.2.5.1. United States 
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions concerning ex-
traterritorial application of the legislation.  First, it authorizes the 
CFTC and the SEC, with certain exceptions, to prohibit an entity 
domiciled in a foreign country from participating in the US in any 
swap or security-based swap activities if the regulation of swaps or 
security-based swaps markets in a foreign country undermines the 
stability of the US financial system.251  Moreover, it provides the 
CFTC with jurisdiction over activities outside of the US which either 
(1) have a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or ef-
fect on, commerce of the US,” or (2) contravene rules or regulations 
by the CFTC that are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion 
of its provisions.252  The SEC has a similar authority regarding the 
security-based swaps, where it is “necessary or appropriate to pre-
vent . . . evasion.”253 
Under the authority granted to it by the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
CFTC issued the CFTC Cross-Border Guidance,254 which contains 
the proposed regulations for derivative transactions with non-US 
persons.  The Guidance permits “substitute compliance” if the entity 
                                                     
251 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §715 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 8304). 
252 Id. §722 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2). 
253 Id. §772 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd). 
254 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41, 214 (July 12, 2012). 
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complies with the requirements in its home country and the CFTC 
deems those requirements to be adequate—that is, comparable with 
the US rules and comprehensive.255  The CFTC has changed its pro-
posal several times before issuing the final version,256 which is still 
not a final rule but only interpretive “guidance.”  The SEC has also 
proposed rules for determining the extraterritorial application of 
rules governing security-based swaps.257  
3.2.5.2. EU  
The EMIR also contains several rules regarding extraterritorial 
application of its provisions.  First, the clearing and risk-mitigation 
requirements apply to transactions between two entities established 
in one or more third countries that would be subject to the clearing 
obligation if they were established in the EU, provided that the con-
tract has a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU or 
where such obligation is necessary or appropriate to prevent the 
evasion of any provisions of the EMIR.258  
The ESMA must develop draft regulatory and technical stand-
ards that specify which types of contracts are considered to have a 
direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU or in which 
cases extraterritorial application is necessary or appropriate to pre-
vent the evasion of any provision of the EMIR.259  Under the current 
                                                     
255 Generally, the Guidance considers 4 categories of persons: (1) US Persons; 
(2) Non-US Persons; (3) Non-US Persons guaranteed by US Persons; (4) Non-US 
Persons that are “conduit affiliates” of US Persons.  Certain considerations apply to 
bank branches and to non-US persons with agents or employees who act from 
within the United States.  Regulatory requirements are categorized as “Entity-Level 
Requirements” and “Transaction-Level Requirements” for purposes of determin-
ing application and whether “substituted compliance” may be available.    
256 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45, 292 (July 26, 2013).  
257 Exchange Act Release No. 34-69490 (“Cross-Border Security-Based Swap 
Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating 
to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap 
Participants”), 78 Fed. Reg. 100, 968, 976 (May 23, 2013). 
258 See EMIR, supra note 136, art. 4(1)(a)(v); see also EMIR, supra note 136, art. 
11(12). 
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version of its standards,260 the ESMA identifies the following cate-
gories of such transactions:  (1) where at least one counterparty is a 
third country entity benefiting from a guarantee provided by an EU 
financial counterparty;261 (2) where the two counterparties enter into 
the OTC derivative contract via their branches in the EU;262 (3) where 
the primary purpose of the contract is to avoid or abuse application 
of the EMIR.263  However, as in the case with the CFTC’s “guidance”, 
these are not final rules. 
Moreover, transactions between a financial counterparty or a 
non-financial counterparty above the clearing threshold and a third 
country entity that would be subject to the clearing obligation if it 
were established in the EU are also subject to the clearing obligation 
under the EMIR.264 
Finally, a CCP established in a third country may provide clear-
ing services to clearing members or trading venues established in 
the EU only if it is recognized by ESMA.265 
3.2.5.3. US vs. EU 
The extraterritorial provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
EMIR are substantially similar in that they allow regulatory agencies 
to assert jurisdiction if the contract has a domestic effect or if the 
contract is an attempt to evade a regulation.  
                                                     
260 ESMA, Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on contracts having a direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect within the Union and non-evasion of provisions 
of EMIR (July 17, 2013), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/      li-
brary/2015/11/2013-892_draft_rts_of_emir.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DKJ-6M4K]. 
261 See id. at 23 (covering all or part of liability resulting from the OTC deriva-
tive contract, to the extent that the guarantee meets certain conditions).  
262 See id. at 24 (noting the contracts with a direct, substantial or foreseeable 
effect within the EU). 
263 See id. at 24 (discussing when a contract is a part of an artificial arrangement 
with the primary purpose to defeat the object, spirit or purpose of any provision of 
the EMIR.  This is determined by the ESMA as the case where it is necessary to 
prevent the evasion of the EMIR.) 
264 See EMIR, supra note 136, art. 4(1)(a)(iv) (stating that “between a financial 
counterparty or a non-financial counterparty meeting the conditions referred to in 
Article 10(1)(b) and an entity established in a third country that would be subject to 
the clearing obligation if it were established in the Union”). 
265 Id. art. 25(1). 
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The advantage of both the Dodd-Frank and EMIR extraterritori-
ality provisions is that the regulatory authorities can have extraor-
dinary jurisdictional reach over any transaction that involves a US 
or EU entity.  Given the global nature of the OTC derivatives market, 
broad extraterritorial jurisdiction may be necessary to ensure that 
the participants in the market do not develop approaches to under-
mine the intent of national regulations.  Moreover, as both regula-
tions are aimed at reducing systemic risk, obviously, it is necessary 
to regulate not only the national market participants but also their 
foreign counterparties,266 taking into account the aforementioned in-
terconnectedness factor.  Besides, in the absence of extraterritorial 
provisions other countries would be incentivized to provide an un-
regulated environment to attract the derivatives participants.   
However, the disadvantage of the approach is that it is likely to 
have a chilling effect, i.e., it will discourage some foreign counter-
parties from doing business with US or EU entities or to engage in 
transactions that could affect US or EU interests.  In addition, exces-
sive regulatory eagerness could encourage regulatory arbitrage—
i.e., drive global businesses toward jurisdictions that are clearly be-
yond the reach of the US and the EU.  
Another disadvantage of the extraterritorial provisions in the US 
and EU efforts at regulating the OTC derivatives market is the prob-
ability of the lack of harmonization in the regulations, even though 
the CFTC and the European Commission issued a joint statement 
indicating that “[they] will not seek to apply our rules (unreasona-
bly) in the other jurisdiction, but will rely on the application and en-
forcement of the rules by the other jurisdiction.”267  While the EU 
and the US have not yet promulgated their final rules, from the pro-
posals issued by the relevant regulators it is likely that they will con-
tain substantial differences as, for instance, the CFTC’s “guidance” 
seems much more detailed and complicated in comparison with the 
ESMA’s straightforward and concise approach.  As a result, OTC 
derivatives counterparties doing business in both jurisdictions may 
                                                     
266 John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation:  Why E.T. Can’t Come 
Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260 (2014). 
267 Press Release, CFTC and European Commission, The European Commis-
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have to comply with two sets of regulations, which could substan-
tially increase transaction costs. 
Thus, one of the main issues regarding extraterritorial applica-
tion relates to the harmonization of different national regulations, as 
most of derivatives transactions take place across borders.  It is par-
ticularly important to coordinate the implementation of the OTC de-
rivatives market reforms.  Identified problems regulating cross-bor-
der transactions include the need to comply with various regulatory 
regimes and the lack of proper coordination in the application of 
regulation.  In some jurisdictions the same type of requirements ap-
ply differently, which increases uncertainty for market participants.  
To solve the cross-border issues related to overlapping cross-border 
regulatory regimes and regulatory arbitrage, the OTC Derivatives 
Regulators Group (ODRG) was created by G20 leaders in 2011.  
However, it has not reached significant progress yet.  
3.2.6. Closing Word on US and EU 
After analyzing the European and American regulations on OTC 
derivatives, it is reasonable to conclude that both countries have 
taken significant actions towards increasing the transparency and 
mitigating the risk of operations in the OTC market.  However, the 
US legislation seems a little more concrete, meaning detailed, or 
even constructive.  This may be explained by first, that the American 
market suffered much more severely during the crisis of 2008 from 
the OTC transactions, and, second, that the legislative process in the 
EU is interfaced to the big bureaucratic procedures connected with 
interstate coordination.  On the other hand, the European approach 
is less fragmented and therefore more comprehensive, which is par-
tially due to the absence of any previous OTC derivatives regulation.  
Despite differences in approaches to regulation in the US and 
Europe, the general principles of the derivatives market infrastruc-
ture development and the conclusion of the OTC transactions are 
very similar.  The main common features determined by the speci-
fied acts are the following:  (1) centralized clearing of the OTC in-
struments; (2) orientation towards higher standardization of deriv-
atives; (3) OTC derivatives trade standardized on special electronic 
platforms; and (4) increased transparency through extensive report-
ing requirements.  In fact, all four main G20 recommendations were 
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adopted in the US and the EU with changes not only in the regula-
tion of OTC derivatives as instruments, but also in their market in-
frastructure. 
Nonetheless, there are still a lot of specific rules to be determined 
by the regulators in the near future.  Moreover, the regulators have 
to identify and resolve cross-border issues associated with imple-
mentation of the regulations.  Additionally, a certain period of time 
is necessary to observe how efficient the regulations are.  Hence, it 
is still very early to make any definitive conclusions. 
3.3. Model Regulatory Framework 
The previous sections of this Article gave an overview of deriv-
atives and discussed their role in the financial crisis of 2008, ex-
plained the current regulatory regimes in the US and the EU for OTC 
derivatives, and, through a comparative analysis of the two regimes, 
identified the advantages and disadvantages of each.  This section 
develops a high-level Model Regulatory Framework for the regula-
tion of OTC derivatives based on the regulatory regimes in the US 
and the EU.  
A model regulatory framework for OTC derivatives should en-
compass the basic elements necessary to achieve the core intended 
goal of regulation, which is to reduce the various mentioned risks in 
the OTC market.  It is necessary to ensure that jurisdictions do not 
approach the regulation of OTC derivatives in a piecemeal fashion, 
which could be counterproductive to the intended goal of regula-
tion.  The Model Regulatory Framework can provide guidance con-
cerning the elements that should be incorporated into regulations 
for the OTC derivatives market. 
3.3.1. Purpose of Regulation 
Before designing and discussing each area of the Model Regula-
tory Framework, it is necessary to outline the purpose of OTC de-
rivatives regulation and make certain assumptions regarding cur-
rent trends of the OTC market.  
The purpose of the OTC derivative regulations should be to de-
velop an OTC market that has a registry and clearing requirements.  
Such a market would be a preparatory step to a unified exchange 
market for most derivatives including swaps, the creation of which 
would eliminate the various risks connected with the unregulated 
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derivatives market in the past, such as the transparency and coun-
terparty risks and would reduce overall systemic risk. 
The derivatives market can have many different structures and 
would be characterized by the presence or absence of central clear-
ing and trading requirements.  The simplest structure is an OTC 
market, in which the counterparties deal directly with each other 
through bilateral negotiations.  In this type of market, the trades 
generally take place between large, well-capitalized firms that desire 
to maximize flexibility in their ability to craft a customized deriva-
tive contract to meet their specific needs.  The parties to the agree-
ment set the collateral and margin requirements.  Lacking a registry 
and clearing requirements, this market, however, has a high level of 
counterparty risk and is very opaque to regulators unable to identify 
abuses or fraudulent practices. 
In the OTC clearinghouse market, transactions are made 
through a central counterparty and mostly with standardized con-
tracts.  There is little counterparty risk, with continuous and con-
sistent mark-to-market valuation of positions and collateral.  There 
is, obviously, more transparency in a CCP market with daily settle-
ment prices available to the public.  Regulators can much more eas-
ily and consistently monitor transactions in the CCP market and can 
set some criteria for the operation of the CCP.  Subsequently, the 
exchange market, where most of the derivatives are traded after be-
ing cleared, also offers the greatest amount of counterparty protec-
tion and can accommodate the needs of retail traders.  
The underlying assumption in developing a model for regula-
tion is that the global financial market for derivatives is trending to-
ward an exchange market in which derivative contracts are stand-
ardized, pricing is conducted constantly, and there is sufficient 
transparency so all market participants are aware of the market con-
ditions, especially pricing.  Based on this assumption, some of the 
key elements are:  standardized derivative instruments, responsibil-
ity for regulatory oversight of the market and institutions such as 
CCPs, and explicit provisions for central banks to provide emer-
gency liquidity for key market participants in the event of a severe 
market downturn or collapse.  The development of a CCP system is 
significant because there is also a necessity in an exchange market to 
reduce counterparty risk.  The Model Framework for derivative reg-
ulation should also assume that global trading in derivatives may 
require a harmonized framework in major jurisdictions such as the 
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US and the EU to ensure that even large well-established firms are 
required to use CCPs to minimize risk of default.  As a result, devel-
oping a CCP market for derivatives is a preliminary step for moving 
the derivative markets towards an exchange market.  
At the same time, the Model Framework should accept the 
premise that not all derivatives should be subject to standardization 
because counterparties want to tailor the terms of their derivatives 
contract to their specific needs.  The terms of many derivatives and 
particularly the terms of swaps have to be determined by the parties 
to ensure that it meets their specific purposes.  The Model Frame-
work should acknowledge the need for certain market participants 
to use customized derivative instruments should there be a legiti-
mate business reason for not using a standardized instrument.  
Thus, the Model Framework should offer the highly customized de-
rivatives some kind of alternative to clearing and exchange trading.   
3.3.2. Single Regulatory Authority 
The grant of oversight authority to a single regulatory agency 
would lead to greater efficiency in oversight and in the administra-
tion of regulations concerning OTC derivatives markets for many 
reasons.  
First, the logic that lies behind having a single regulatory agency 
is that uniformity and consistency are necessary in the regulation of 
instruments that have the same economic function.  Additionally, it 
reduces transaction costs for the regulated entities because they 
have to meet the requirements established by only one regulatory 
agency.  In addition, there is less likelihood that the regulated par-
ticipants will have to suffer from the uncertainty of conflicting reg-
ulations, confusion and a fragmented regulatory framework when 
only one agency is responsible for regulating activity related to OTC 
derivatives markets.  Finally, another rationale for granting author-
ity to a single agency is to prevent the development of interagency 
rivalry and further emphasize the boundaries between agencies that 
could impede effective regulation of the derivatives market.268  
Thus, the regulatory approach should be intended to reduce any 
ambiguity and confusion that can arise from the attempt by multiple 
agencies to regulate the same market.  
                                                     
268 Michael W. Taylor, The Road from “Twin Peaks”— And the Way Back, 16 
CONN. INS. L. J. 61, 74 (2009). 
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However, it shall be noted that, apart from a single and central 
regulatory agency, certain other governmental authorities, in partic-
ular the central bank, need to be empowered to monitor the deriva-
tives market and provide their opinions in the form of consultation, 
as is currently the case to some degree in the US and more explicitly 
in the EU.  This is important as the derivatives market involves huge 
financial institutions, and various banking instruments serve as un-
derliers of the derivatives themselves.  
A potential disadvantage of using a single regulatory agency is 
the possibility of regulatory capture by the entities that the agency 
is intended to regulate.  That is, there is the risk that the single reg-
ulatory agency will act in favor of the commercial or special interests 
that dominate the industry instead of holding them accountable for 
the public interest.269  To protect against regulatory capture, legisla-
tion should include provisions ensuring that regulators keep the bal-
ance between the interests of the public and the regulated financial 
industry.  The agency and its officials should be independent of the 
political process to reduce the possibility of such a regulatory cap-
ture.  As fairly noted by Stavros Gadinis,270 there are two major jus-
tifications for having an agency of independent bureaucrats:  
(1) such experts, being dispassionate, make decisions based solely 
on scientific evidence; (2) due to the absence of their interest in win-
ning elections every few years, they set and focus on long-term 
goals.  
Finally, another aspect regarding the regulatory agency is its 
powers to establish and implement rules.  Certainly, the agency has 
to be authorized to issue such rules as the derivatives market and 
the national and global economy change; the regulator is in a much 
better position to follow their dynamic and promptly react to any 
such changes than parliament or Congress in the case of the US.  
Moreover, after the regulation is adopted and becomes effective, cer-
tain clarifications may be required upon its enforcement in practice.  
Again in this case the regulator seems to be the most competent and 
immediate arbiter that is most able to maintain stability in the mar-
ket, even more so than the courts.  However, the extent to which the 
                                                     
269 Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administra-
tive Agencies, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 94 (1992). 
270 Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 
CAL. L. REV. 327, 339 (2013). 
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regulator may effectively provide such clarifications through new 
rules may be different and depend on a concrete situation in a spe-
cific country as explicitly shown in the example of the US and the 
EU.  In a single country, the authority of the regulator can be rather 
broad, whereas on a multinational level, it seems better to make it 
more limited to maintain uniformity, despite the slowing down of 
the speed of regulatory actions.  Nevertheless, in general, the core 
aspects shall be provided by the regulation/statute with the availa-
bility of a regulatory agency to further determine them without 
making significant changes.   
3.3.3. One Definition for All Instruments 
To create a harmonized framework for derivatives, a compre-
hensive definition of derivatives as well as of OTC derivatives is nec-
essary, as opposed to having several different types of derivatives 
based on the underliers.  As discussed in the previous section of this 
Part, the focus shall be on the economic function of the instruments 
rather than on the type of their underlying assets.  Obviously, this 
additionally justifies the existence of a single regulatory authority as 
the same type of instrument, e.g., CDS and a single-name CDS, 
should be regulated in the same manner. 
The definition of derivatives has to be rather broad, on the one 
hand, but should also outline certain limits and specify the types of 
the regulated instruments.  It should not provide an enumerated, 
exhaustive list, so as not to create confusion for the market partici-
pants.  The purpose of broad regulatory provisions concerning cov-
ered instruments is to facilitate the possibility of the financial indus-
try developing new types of exotic derivatives in the future.  
Therefore, the regulatory agency has to be enabled to determine the 
exact scope of the covered derivatives and constantly update it.  To 
reduce the risk of any confusion and second-guessing, the regula-
tion could also explicitly determine the instruments that are not cov-
ered instead of attempting to exclude them by simply not listing 
them in the derivatives definition. 
Lastly, as to the statutory language, the terms defined in the reg-
ulation have to be very close to those used in the market and finance 
practices.  More precisely, the classic conservative terms “deriva-
tive” and “OTC derivative” seem to be the most appropriate ones.  
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Thus, an effective regulation should create as much certainty as 
possible in terms of the covered instruments for the market partici-
pants.   
3.3.4. Two-Level Parties Classification 
The focus of the regulation should be on covering transactions 
with all persons participating in the derivatives market generally, 
regardless of the instrument type.  In other words, the parties have 
to be covered on something other than a “product-by-product” ba-
sis.  This will ensure both avoidance of any fragmentation issues and 
coverage of all derivatives trading participants. 
However, a certain division of the covered parties is necessary, 
and not just simply on one level.  First, such distinction has to be 
based on the nature of the parties’ activities, i.e. financial and non-
financial.  Non-financial activities that satisfy threshold require-
ments should be exempt from mandatory central clearing.  The reg-
ulation should use the concept of “non-financial party” and clearly 
define this concept.  The definition should specifically indicate that 
it applies only to entities that do not conduct business in the finan-
cial industry.  Moreover, on the next level, the financial counterpar-
ties most actively involved in the derivatives trading—i.e. “rain-
makers”—should be classified as dealers or major participants,271 
depending on their roles.  These parties should be required to regis-
ter with the regulatory agency tasked with determining the criteria 
of such dealers or major participants.  The two-level classification of 
the derivatives market participants seems to be the most appropri-
ate as it both provides special treatment to big players and creates a 
basis for exempting the least significant ones. 
Finally, the model regulation should avoid specific provisions 
regarding derivatives trading by banks like the Volcker and Push-
Out Rules. 272  One reason for that is the previously mentioned fair 
points of criticism including the fact that excessive market risk via 
speculative trades is important to the derivatives market as specula-
tors represent a source of liquidity.  Certainly, the attempt of pre-
venting banks from taking such risks could protect taxpayers from 
massive bailouts like in 2008 and move risky derivatives trades into 
                                                     
271 Using the language of the Dodd-Frank Act to make it clearer. 
272 In its original version before the amendment. 
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more diverse framework. 273  However, this seems more like banking 
rather than derivatives regulation. 
3.3.5. Plain Vanilla Clearing 
The key aspects of any regulation regarding the clearing require-
ment are:  (1) instruments subject to clearing; and (2) manner of 
CCPs’ operation. 
In the Model Regulatory Framework, only “plain vanilla” deriv-
atives—i.e., highly standard ones, have to be subject to the manda-
tory clearing requirements, as the regulation should be an initial 
step towards the smooth standardization of most instruments.  This 
will also solve the issue of “lost” bilateral netting opportunities in 
cases where all instruments are subject to clearing, as now the par-
ties can reduce the counterparty net exposure by clearing their cus-
tomized instruments bilaterally.  Thus, the regulator should be au-
thorized to constantly analyze the market and consider the level of 
standardization, trade volume, and other factors when defining de-
rivatives to be cleared.  Moreover, the regulatory agency should en-
courage standardization of the instruments, but not in a coercive 
way.  It is very important to keep in mind that due to their main 
economic function, i.e., hedging, absolute derivatives standardiza-
tion is infeasible.  An example of such non-coercive encouragement 
could be relatively lower margin or collateral requirements for the 
cleared instruments, which would reduce transaction costs.  How-
ever, in certain extreme cases, it seems possible to partially apply the 
aforementioned method of derivatives treatment suggested by Lynn 
Stout, but in a slightly modified way.  For instance, derivatives with 
a notional amount above a specified threshold that are created solely 
for speculation purposes may be deemed unenforceable unless they 
are cleared through a CCP and traded on a trade execution facility, 
provided that clearing and trading for such contracts are available.  
Certainly, such a provision needs careful consideration and has to 
be implemented via clear statutory language in order to prevent any 
confusion, ambiguity, or unintended consequences.  Besides, the 
regulation should contain margin and collateral requirements for all 
uncleared instruments to reduce the counterparty exposure risks.    
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The regulation should also have an explicit and rather detailed 
end-user exemption.  An effective approach would be to exempt 
both commercial enterprises engaged in hedging and non-financial 
parties who meet a certain clearing threshold.  Put simply, there 
should be a relatively broad end-user definition that includes vari-
ous participants and sets up a clearing threshold for them.  In prac-
tice, the regulation would allow commercial risk hedging when a 
specific size or duration of the derivative contract is not available in 
a standardized form on the exchange market.  The notional amount 
of the contract, however, must be below a threshold amount, above 
which the transaction would no longer be exempt.  Covering large 
hedging contracts makes the size of the OTC derivative market un-
der regulation larger.  At the same time, the exception reduces the 
possibility that the cost of compliance with the regulation will have 
a chilling or discouraging effect on the hedging activities of smaller 
businesses.  In addition, covering large hedging contracts in the reg-
ulation reduces the possibility of using derivatives as a means of 
speculation rather than hedging.  The regulation should also specify 
the hedging requirements.  As mentioned earlier, these require-
ments could be:  (1) existence of commercial risk for the company 
without using derivatives; (2) dependence on the hedged underlier; 
(3) intention of the company’s executives responsible for entering 
derivatives.  
The justification of having special entities exercising the clearing, 
i.e., CCPs, was provided in the previous sections when comparing 
the regimes in the US and the EU.  However, the regulator should 
try to prevent the emergence of multiple clearing houses and should 
be authorized to set high requirements for them.  Otherwise, this 
could lead to a race to the bottom when multiple CCPs compete with 
each other in different ways, for instance by lowering their stand-
ards.274  Moreover, the existence of numerous CCPs will lead to the 
clearance of derivatives between the same parties by different clear-
inghouses that will, eventually, decrease the efficiency of obligations 
netting.275  However, as a countermeasure, interoperability of clear-
ing houses could be authorized, i.e., netting from one CCP to an-
other.  This would allow to net obligations all over the market, sim-
ilar to the case before the regulation, but through a safe CCP system.  
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The regulation should also require CCPs to set adequate margin and 
collateral standards to reduce counterparty risk.  Finally, the Model 
Regulatory Framework has to address the concern that the regulator 
and CCPs are incapable of appropriately managing risks solely on 
their own as they do not have the necessary funds and resources to 
analyze the complex market in a proper way.276  For instance, there 
could be a special committee with major market players that can, 
based on the market players’ research, keep the regulatory agency 
and/or CCPs informed on the main issues arising in the derivatives 
market. 
3.3.6. OTC Register 
The concept of the register is rather simple and straightforward.  
It is a database of all OTC derivatives transactions.  This would be a 
great support for the regulators to monitor the market conditions, 
identify risks and immediately react to the existing issues.  Moreo-
ver, such a register could be of substantial aid for market partici-
pants to adequately assess the situation in the market.  More de-
tailed application of such a register is given further. 
First, the regulator should establish a public register in order to 
identify the classes of OTC derivatives subject to the clearing obli-
gation, the list of authorized CCPs, and the trade repositories and 
execution facilities.  Second, counterparties and/or CCPs should re-
port the details of any derivative contract (either cleared or not) they 
have concluded and further modifications or termination of that 
contract to a trade repository, or, in the absence of one, to the regu-
lator.  Moreover, the counterparties or CCPs should also report on 
the performance status of the transactions, i.e., whether the obliga-
tions are fulfilled.  This will enable the regulator to identify potential 
risky market participants, especially in the case of uncleared trans-
actions.  Trade repositories or the regulator will then publish aggre-
gate positions by class of derivatives on the contracts reported to 
them.  
Thus, the specific details of each transaction, i.e., parties names, 
notional amount and term, are not disclosed to public and known 
only by the regulator, who can constantly monitor the market con-
ditions and immediately step in as needed.  However, CCPs and 
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trade execution facilities should also be enabled to request such spe-
cific information by making a justified inquiry to the regulator. 
For example, a CCP or a trade execution facility may really need 
details of an uncleared OTC transaction in order to set margin re-
quirements for counterparties who have a poor record of fulfilling 
their obligation under uncleared transactions.   
3.3.7. Mutual Recognition 
Extraterritoriality issues have to be addressed in the regulation.  
However, the “substituted compliance” method, which is used 
when a domestic regulator examines requirements of foreign regu-
latory regimes and determines their comparability and equivalence 
to the domestic regulation, does not seem to be a very efficient ap-
proach, as such determinations are made unilaterally and on a case-
by-case basis. 
Instead, we suggest choosing one of the following ways of deal-
ing with the cross-border issues, all based on mutual recognition 
principle.  This principle holds that countries work together and the 
whole regime is subject to such recognition.  First, the countries 
where the majority of the derivatives trade is executed (e.g., the US 
and the EU) can together determine, in a form of a published guid-
ance, the requirements for recognizing another regulatory frame-
work as equivalent to theirs.277  This would give other countries that 
have yet to adopt relevant laws an idea on how to structure their 
regulation in order to join the guidance and would lead to global 
harmonization.278  Alternatively, several countries significant in 
terms of derivatives trading (or even all G20 countries) may develop 
and sign an international treaty setting up the minimum require-
ments for national derivatives regulation.  Additionally, the coun-
tries that are members to the treaty or have joined the guidance may 
agree on the establishment of multinational clearinghouses and 
trade execution facilities for cross-border transactions.  The critical 
factor in implementing the suggested options is speed—the rules 
should be promptly developed before other countries adopt their 
own regulations.    
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3.3.8. Emerging Markets Disclaimer 
It shall be noted that the suggested Model Regulatory Frame-
work is most appropriate for countries that have a well-established 
and developed derivatives market.  To implement this model in 
emerging markets, certain adjustments have to be made.  First of all, 
in terms of implementation timeframe, not all regulatory instru-
ments, i.e., clearing, reporting, and trading, have to be introduced at 
once.  The legislatures should acknowledge that any regulation 
should slightly anticipate but not be far in advance of the economic 
relations subject to regulation.  In other words, the derivatives mar-
ket in a specific country should essentially maturate to the point 
when it needs to be regulated.  Otherwise, heavy regulation of an 
emerging market can slow down or even prevent its further devel-
opment, as implementing various regulatory mechanisms at once in 
an underdeveloped market could create significant transaction bur-
dens and costs for the market participants.  Thus, the regulation 
should be implemented step-by-step after careful analysis of the 
market conditions on the need of a particular regulatory instrument.  
However, what a legislature in an emerging market can start 
with and what should be the first step of implementing the Model 
Regulatory Framework is to set up a general legal framework by 
adopting rules defining the derivatives.  This would create a basis 
for the future regulation and serve as a signal for the market partic-
ipants.  Another thing that can be done immediately, even in an 
emerging market, is adopting reporting requirements for all OTC 
transactions in order to create an OTC derivatives database.  This 
would, first, enable the regulator to monitor the market regularly 
and identify the necessity for its further regulation.  Moreover, hav-
ing data on all OTC transactions helps to analyze the market condi-
tions in order to tailor the new rules, e.g., clearing or trading require-
ments, to the current market conditions and prevent overregulation. 
Depending on the market development dynamics, the legisla-
ture could either implement the remaining parts of the Model Reg-
ulatory Framework as a next phase of regulation or take the follow-
ing intermediary step.  If the market develops not as rapidly as the 
European and American markets did, it is worth adopting rules di-
viding market participants, but only on a single level as opposed to 
the two-level structure suggested by the model framework.  In other 
words, the market participants have to be split up between financial 
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and non-financial counterparties.  Furthermore, as part of the inter-
mediary phase, clearing and trading requirements could be imposed 
on financial parties in a so-called test run mode, i.e., clearing would 
be voluntary, so that the regulator can identify the most appropriate 
clearing and trading requirements.  Once the OTC market becomes 
developed enough, the model framework may be implemented in 
full, but again with certain adjustment due to the concrete market 
specifics. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Over the past several decades, derivatives have become a major 
factor in global financial markets.  Investors use derivatives to hedge 
against changes in the value of the underlying asset or to speculate 
on movements in its price.  The importance of the derivatives for 
these functions has significantly increased as global financial mar-
kets move towards greater integration.  At the same time, the in-
creased interest in derivatives has led to the development of new 
types of instruments and practices such as CDSs, which market par-
ticipants use as a means of transferring some of the risk of default of 
the underlying instrument.  Moreover, as almost completely unreg-
ulated instruments, OTC derivatives have certain inherent risks. 
The rapid growth of the derivative markets as well as the prom-
inent role that derivatives played in the financial crisis of 2008 have 
created pressure on governments to give regulators greater power 
to supervise and control the OTC derivative market.  For exactly this 
reason, a lot of attention in recent years in the US and the EU was 
paid to the regulation of the financial markets.  Ambitious regula-
tions adopted by the EU and the US have not yet yielded expected 
results.  The Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the EMIR in the EU are 
the first substantial step to regulating the OTC derivatives market.  
Prior to the enactment of the legislation, there were significant gaps 
in the ability of the regulatory agencies in the jurisdictions to moni-
tor, oversee and effectively regulate the operation of the non-stand-
ardized OTC derivatives market.  The legislation has increased 
transparency in the market by requiring the use of data trade repos-
itories.  It also, at least theoretically, has reduced systemic risk by 
establishing the authority to regulate CCPs and the counterparty 
risk through the adoption of clearing and trading requirements. 
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Despite the similarities between the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
EMIR, there remain many points of distinction that set up separate 
regulatory regimes of the OTC derivatives market.  Many of the dif-
ferences are due to the variation in the historical development of fi-
nancial regulation in both jurisdictions.  In addition, there is still un-
certainty whether the regulatory frameworks adopted by the US and 
the EU will be effective in solving the issues caused by derivatives 
in the marketplace and for reducing some of the inherent risks of 
using derivatives.  It is also not clear whether the differences in reg-
ulatory requirements will create additional burdens on the opera-
tion of the OTC derivatives markets.  Apparently, we have to wait 
until the regulation in both jurisdictions is fully implemented and 
established with all additional rules and technical standards in order 
to see how efficiently it operates in practice. 
Relying on the suggested Model Regulatory Framework can be 
useful for harmonizing the various regulatory approaches used in 
different jurisdictions such as the US and the EU.  The Model Frame-
work can adopt the strengths of the various approaches in regulat-
ing the OTC derivative market while eliminating many of the draw-
backs.  The Model Regulatory Framework can also serve as a guide 
for developing a regulatory approach to the OTC derivatives market 
in jurisdictions that have not yet adopted their own regulations.  
However, it shall be implemented with certain adjustments in 
emerging markets.  Over the long run, the use of the Model Regula-
tory Framework can serve as a support tool for coordinating and 
implementing a global regulatory regime that will reduce risk in the 
OTC derivatives market and move most of the derivatives industry 
towards greater reliance, transparency and safety on a standardized 
exchange market.  
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